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Peggy J. Blair* Prosecuting the Fishery: The
Supreme Court of Canada and
the Onus of Proof in Aboriginal
Fishing Cases
In Sparrow and other decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada has outlined
certain tests which must be met by the Crown and defence in the trial of aboriginal
fishing cases where s.35 rights are at issue. This article describes the shifting
burdens of proof which have resulted from those tests. The author argues that the
Supreme Court of Canada has imposed procedural and substantive require-
ments of proof on the defence which may in themselves be unconstitutional.
Dans Sparrow comme dans d'autres d6cisions, la Cour supreme du Canada a
expos6 certains critores qui doivent 6tre respect6s par la Couronne et la d~fense
dans le proces des causes de la p~che autochtone ot) les droits garantis par
'art. 35 sont en question. Cet article docrit la charge de la preuve qui est en
mouvement a cause de ces critbres. L'auteurargumente que la Coursupr6me du
Canada a impos6 des exigences substantielles et proc6duri6res de preuve sur
la d6fense qui peuvent en elles-m~mes 6tre inconstitutionnelles.
Introduction
Aboriginal fishing prosecutions where the accused invokes an aboriginal
or treaty rights defence differ significantly from other criminal and quasi-
criminal prosecutions. In most prosecutions, the burden of proof remains
on the Crown throughout trial.' However, where an aboriginal person
who has been charged with such an offence raises section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 19822 as a defence, the burden of proving an aboriginal
or treaty right shifts to the accused once the Crown has established a
prima facie offence.'
* Peggy Blair is an Ottawa lawyer specializing in aboriginal legal issues. A former Crown
prosecutor, Ms. Blair's practice is now restricted to the defence of hunting and fishing charges
involving aboriginal peoples. She was counsel in R. v. Jones, [1993] 12 O.R. (3d) 421, a
precedent-setting case recognizing aboriginal and treaty rights to fish commercially in the
Great Lakes.
1. R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [197812 S.C.R. 1299 at 1314-17, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 [hereinafter
Sault Ste. Marie cited to S.C.R.].
2. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [hereinafter Constitution].
3. There may be an exception to this general principle where specific provisions of legislation
refer to a reverse onus. For example, in R. v. Penasse (1971), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 569, 7 C.N.L.C.
375 [hereinafter Penasse cited to C.C.C.], the Ontario Court, Provincial Division held that it
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While the defence evidence of aboriginal or treaty rights is often
characterized as reply evidence to the Crown's case, it actually results
from a shifting burden of proof requiring the defence to prove the
elements of a s. 35 right on the balance of probabilities. This differs
fundamentally from the burden of proof in most cases, where the defence
need only raise a reasonable doubt. It also imposes an enormous eviden-
tiary burden on the defence, given the developing legal tests which the
aboriginal parties are required to meet.
In R. v. Sparrow,4 the Supreme Court of Canada referred with approval
to one author's analysis of the effect of the Constitution Act, 1982:
the context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a
codification of the case law on aboriginal rights that had accumulated by
1982. Section 35 calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples. It
renounces the old rules of the game under which the Crown established
courts of law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign
claims made by the Crown.'
This paper attempts to outline the current burdens of proof within
Sparrow-type proceedings, as well as the constitutional and other issues
entailed by such procedures. This paper will examine the fundamental
unfairness which has resulted from the Supreme Court of Canada's recent
expansion of the Sparrow tests to apply civil burdens of proof on criminal
defendants. When it comes to "prosecuting the fisheries," it will be
submitted that the "old rules of the game" are still very much in play.
I. The General Framework of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Cases
Aboriginal and treaty rights receive protection from ss. 35 and 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, which state:
35(1). The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
52(1). The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
was incumbent on the Crown to bring the defendants within the sections of the Act which
created an offence and to prove the non-applicability of a treaty with respect to a charge of
selling pickerel, given the provisions of the Game and Fish Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 186 [now
R.S.O. 1990, c. G.I], which created a reverse onus on the accused to prove a "lawful taking"
where the harvest, but not the sale of pickerel, was the subject of charges.
4. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160 [hereinafter Sparrow
cited to S.C.R.].
5. N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95 at
100, quoted in ibid. at 1105 -1106.
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There are two types of s. 35 rights, treaty rights and aboriginal rights.
As noted by Judge Fairgrieve of the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial
Division in R. v. Jones and Nadjiwon,6 aboriginal and treaty rights may
exist together, the learned judge stating, "I accept that treaty fights and
other aboriginal rights are not mutually exclusive and that a treaty can
recognize pre-existing rights, as well as create new ones.'' 7
Where an aboriginal rights defence under Sparrow is successful,
legislation or actions' which are inconsistent with the right and which
cannot be justified are declared unenforceable as being unconstitutional.
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,9 which
renders Charterrights subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be reasonably justified in a free and democratic society, does not
formally apply to s. 35 aboriginal and treaty rights. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court of Canada has developed a test of justification for
infringements of s. 35 which is broadly analogous to s. 1. As noted earlier,
in most prosecutions, the burden of proof remains on the Crown through-
out the trial.'" However, where an aboriginal person raises a s. 35 defence,
the burden of proving the aboriginal or treaty right on a balance of
probabilities shifts to the defence once the Crown has established aprima
facie offence. " Once the defence establishes an aboriginal or treaty right
and prima facie infringement of that right, the Crown may call reply
evidence on the issue of extinguishment and must call evidence of
justification or an acquittal will result. The Crown, of course, may also
call evidence challenging the existence, nature and scope of the right
itself.
The justification aspect of the Crown's case requires proof that the
regulation, law or act infringing upon the s. 35 right is justifiable in
accordance with the tests set out in Sparrow," Nikal, 3 and R. v. Van der
Peet. 4 It is invoked only after the defence has proven an aboriginal or
treaty right. At the justification stage of a trial, the Court examines the
6. R. v. Jones (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 421 [hereinafter Jones].
7. Ibid. at 439.
8. For example, in R. v. Nikal, [199611 S.C.R. 1013, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 658 [hereinafter Nikal
cited to S.C.R.], the Supreme Court declared a specific licence issued in 1986 to be
unconstitutional based on the management scheme in existence at the time.
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
10. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 1.
11. There may be an exception to this general principle where specific provisions of
legislation refer to a reverse onus. Penasse, supra note 3.
12. Supra note 4.
13. Supra note 8.
14. [199612 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [hereinafter Van derPeet cited to S.C.R.J.
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management or regulatory scheme which has resulted in charges being
laid to determine whether it is a justified infringement of the right.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Nikal has reaffirmed the applicability
of the tests set out in Sparrow to the Crown's burden of proving
justification in aboriginal food fishing cases, and has recently applied the
same test to a case involving trade and barter.'5 However, the decision of
the Court in R. v. Gladstone16 released concurrently with Van der Peet
and N. T. C. Smokehouse Ltd.'7 appears to diminish the Crown's burden of
proving justification where commercial fisheries are involved. Since the
Supreme Court has (arguably) not yet ruled on any case in which the
Crown has led justification evidence at trial, there remains an absence of
definitive guidelines as to the procedures to be followed and the degrees
of proof required to meet the Sparrow and Gladstone tests.
II. The Special Relationship Between the Crown and
Aboriginal Peoples
In a prosecution of an aboriginal accused where aboriginal and treaty
rights are invoked, there is a special relationship between the Crown and
aboriginal peoples at stake. This has been described by the Supreme
Court of Canada as the "honour of the Crown."' 8
In any such prosecution, the Crown must prove that the government's
dealings with the accused uphold the honour of the Crown with respect
to its special trust relationship with aboriginal people. The principles
associated with the honour of the Crown were first articulated in R. v.
Taylor and Williams:9
In approaching the terms of a treaty quite apart from the other consider-
ations already noted, the honour of the Crown is always involved and no
appearance of "sharp dealing" should be sanctioned. Mr. Justice
Cartwright emphasized this in his dissenting reasons in R. v. George where
he said:
We should, I think, endeavour to construe the treaty of 1827 and
those Acts of Parliament which bear upon the question before us in
such manner that the honour of the Sovereign may be upheld and
Parliament not made subject to the reproach of having taken away
15. Ibid.
16. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 648 [hereinafter Gladstone cited to S.C.R.].
17. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 528 [hereinafter N.T.C. Smokehouse cited to
S.C.R.].
18. Supra note 4 at 1114.
19. R. v. Taylor (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360,62 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (C.A.) [hereinafter Taylor cited
to O.R.].
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by unilateral action and without consideration the rights solemnly
assured the Indians and their posterity by treaty.20
This test was expanded and better defined by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Sparrow to apply not only to legislation but also to government
actions. The Supreme Court of Canada stated:
[T]he Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government
and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary
recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of
this historic relationship.
... [The] honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal
people. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the govern-
ment vis- -vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining
whether the legislation or action in question can be justified.2'
On the meaning of subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 the
Court held that:
There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court
or any court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that
restricts aboriginal rights. Yet, we find that the words "recognition and
affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and
so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power....
We would not wish to set out an exhaustive list of the factors to be
considered in the assessment of justification. Suffice it to say that recog-
nition and affirmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the rights of
aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and indeed all
Canadians....
... The way in which a-legislative objective is to be attained must
uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique
contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the
Crown and Canada's aboriginal peoples.2
While the fiduciary obligation is held principally by the federal
government, according to Brian Slattery, it is shared with the provincial
governments in areas where the latter exercise constitutional jurisdiction.
The Crown's general fiduciary duty binds both the federal Crown and the
various provincial Crowns within the limits of their respective jurisdic-
tions. The federal Crown has primary responsibility toward native peoples
under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and thus bears the main
20. Ibid. at 360, quoting R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 at 279,55 D.L.R. (2d) 386 [emphasis
added, citations omitted].
21. Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1108, 1114 [emphasis added].
22. Ibid. at 1109, 1119, 1110 [emphasis added].
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burden of the fiduciary trust. But insofar as provincial Crowns have the
power to affect native peoples, they also share in the trust.23
Slattery also writes:
The trust relationship attaches primarily to the Federal government but it
also affects Provincial governments in certain contexts. Prior to Confed-
eration, the Crown was bound in its capacity as head of the various colonies
and territories making up British North America. The rearrangement of
constitutional powers and rights accomplished at Confederation did not
reduce the Crown's overall fiduciary obligations to First Nations. Rather
these obligations tracked the various powers and rights to their destina-
tions in Ottawa and the Provincial capitals. Since section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 makes the Federal government responsible for
"Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians," the main burden of the trust
relationship clearly falls on its shoulders. However, so long as the
Provinces have powers and rights enabling them to affect adversely
Aboriginal interests protected by the relationship, they hold attendant
fiduciary obligations.24
The Commissioners of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba
have also taken the position that the fiduciary obligation applies not only
to the federal government, but is also a responsibility of the provincial
Crowns:
Our courts have established an entirely new approach toward the exami-
nation of Aboriginal legal issues, which includes the fiduciary obligation,
the content of Aboriginal title, and the scope of Aboriginal and treaty
rights. This approach applies to all legislation, whether or not Aboriginal
peoples or their unique legal rights are mentioned. The broad thrust of the
law covers both federal and provincial legislation because both levels of
government owe a fiduciary duty to all Indian, Inuit and Metis people.2"
The process by which the Crown is called upon to prosecute aboriginal
people, who must then defend themselves by proving either rights
through treaties entered into with the Crown, or by virtue of rights which
pre-date Crown sovereignty, creates a situation rife with conflict. As
noted in a recent report prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples:
First Nations find themselves in an untenable situation: due to the unique
historical relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown and to
23. B. Slanery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 755
[emphasis added].
24. "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261
at 274 [emphasis added].
25. Manitoba, Public inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People,
Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: The Justice System and Aboriginal
People (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991) at 160-61, with thanks to Hutchins, Soroka and
Dionne for bringing this reference to the author's attention (see infra note 26) [emphasis
added].
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the policy of the British and later Canadian governments (enshrined in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763) that Aboriginal lands could only be surren-
dered to the Crown, most claims by Aboriginal peoples are against the
Crown. However, this unique relationship and restriction on alienation has
also created a situation wherein the party against whom First Nations hold
most of their grievances is also the party with whom they stand in a
fiduciary relationship....
Crown counsel, however, functions within a context that is inherently
skewed in favour of non-Aboriginal interest. It is not the intention here to
criticize counsel conscientiously carrying out their mandate; it is rather to
question the appropriateness and fairness of that mandate. To the extent
that mandate involves continuing vigorously to prosecute Aboriginal
persons for pursuing activities long recognized in treaties and by the courts
or to argue outmoded precedents or the Crown's own turpitude to deny
rights, that mandate must be questioned.26
That such litigation is often far from trust-like is clear from remarks made
by Justice Wilson in Guerin v. Canada. Justice Wilson indicated that "the
Crown's tactics ... left a lot to be desired" and did not "exemplify the
high standard of professionalism we have come to expect in the conduct
of litigation."27
In a criminal prosecution, the rules of conduct have always been clear.
The Crown must disclose well before trial information in its possession
which may be relevant to the defence. The accused is entitled to an
acquittal if a reasonable doubt is raised. The defence need not present any
evidence by which to do so, and the accused is under no obligation to testify
on his or her own behalf. Finally, if the Crown is unable to meet its burden
of proof, an acquittal results. The criminal justice system does not afford
second chances to the Crown who fails to adduce sufficient evidence at
trial. Given the special fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown, the
aboriginal accused facing charges in which s. 35 rights are raised should
enjoy even greater procedural safeguards than other accused.
In aboriginal prosecutions, however, the Supreme Court has seen fit to
impose a shifting burden of proof. This civil standard, it is submitted, is
inappropriate in criminal proceedings. Not only does it avoid the require-
ments of disclosure, but it may lead to situations where accused persons
are convicted notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, there are many instances in which the Crown has not met its
burden of proof, and has been granted a new trial to try again.
26. See, for instance Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 376, 387, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321,
[1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.], cited in Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Renouncing the Old Rules of the Game (Report) by Hutchins, Dionne &
Soroka, (Ottawa: The Commission, n.d.) [hereinafter Renouncing the Old Rules] on this point.
27. Guerin, ibid. at 353.
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11. An Unfair Onus of Proof
Although s. 35 does not impose an express burden of proof on the defence,
such a burden was implicit in Sparrow. However, in developing a new
and more stringent test for proof of an aboriginal right in Van der Peet,
the Supreme Court took the position that the issue had not been addressed
in Sparrow.
In fact, the Crown had argued before the Supreme Court of Canada in
Sparrow that the defence evidence on the issue of aboriginal rights was
insufficient to discharge the appellant's burden of proof. Indeed, the
existence of an aboriginal right had been at issue throughout the proceed-
ings. The trial court had found as a fact that "Mr. Sparrow was fishing in
ancient tribal territory where his ancestors had fished from time immemo-
rial" but that this did not prove an aboriginal right. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's conclusion, finding that
the existence of an aboriginal right was not in serious dispute. In its
factum before the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow, the Federal
Government insisted that:
The burden of proof of the factual existence of the aboriginal right asserted
by the Appellant on April 17, 1982 rests upon the Appellant. To discharge
this burden, the Appellant is required to adduce extensive and
well-substantiated evidence.28
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, upheld the British Columbia
Court of Appeal's finding on this point, stating that while the evidence
was not extensive, and between 1867 and 1961 was "scanty", it had not
been disputed or contradicted in the courts below. This left sufficient
evidence of continuity of the right to support the Court of Appeal's
finding that an aboriginal right existed. Although the Supreme Court had,
in Sparrow, expressly addressed the evidence of an aboriginal right
which had been adduced at Sparrow's trial, it proceeded to outline a new
and more onerous test to the accused in Van der Peet. In the first line of
its judgment, the Court noted that the appeal raised the issue left
outstanding in Sparrow, namely how aboriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act were to be defined.2 9 What
had been implied with respect to an onus of proof on an accused claiming
a s. 35 aboriginal fight was now explicit. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6,
dissenting on other grounds, stated that "ft]he onus is on the claimant to
prove that he or she benefits from an existing aboriginal right."30
28. Quoted in Renouncing the Old Rules, supra note 26 at 21 [emphasis added].
29. Supra note 14 at 526.
30. Ibid. at 585.
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In Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer wrote about the public interest in
reconciliation between aboriginal societies and the Crown, stating:
I would note that the legal literature also supports the position that s.
35(1) provides the constitutional framework for reconciliation of the
pre-existence of distinctive aboriginal societies occupying the land with
Crown sovereignty.3
Having described the task as one of reconciliation, howeVer, the Supreme
Court has developed an onus of proof which does not honour the
relationship it described. As well, it should be noted that Justice McLachlin
stated that the majority had exceeded the Court's proper role in attempt-
ing to cut back on aboriginal rights in the interest of reconciliation and
"social harmony":
A large view of justification which cuts back the aboriginal right on the
ground that this is required for reconciliation and social harmony should
not be adopted. It runs counter to the authorities, is indeterminate and
ultimately more political than legal. A more limited view ofjustification,
that the Crown may prohibit exploitation of the resource that is incompat-
ible with its continued and responsible use, should be adopted.32
Given the existing onus of proof, the defence is required to meet
overwhelming and expensive tests of an aboriginal or treaty right before
the Crown is required to respond on thejustification issue. Frequently, the
Crown has called little or no evidence on the issue for which it bears the
burden of proof. Even so, the Supreme Court has required little or no
evidence on which to decide that that justification has been proven.
In several instances, the Court proceeded to determine that justifica-
tion has been met and that management schemes, about which it had heard
no evidence, were justified. In Nikal, for example, the Court ruled that the
requirement of a licence was not unreasonable since it was, at its most
basic, simply a means by which rights-holders could be identified.33
However, there was no evidence before the Court on the issue of rational
connection between a licence and justification (there in fact was no
licence in Nikal). There is no need for a fishing licence as a means of
identifying a member of Mr. Nikal's band; band members carry status
cards issued by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. Aborigi-
nal fishing charges arise in circumstances where the issue is not the
identity of the person charged, but rather the legality of the terms and
conditions which would attach to licenses if issued or accepted. Further-
more, the communal licensing scheme which exists in provinces such as
31. Ibid. at 547 [emphasis added].
32. Ibid. at 520 (headnote summary of dissenting opinion).
33. Nikal, supra note 8 at 1060.
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British Columbia and which was at issue in Nikal does not result in
licences being issued to individuals in any event; they are issued to the
community, since the rights at issue are held collectively and not by
individuals.
In Van derPeet, no issue ofjustification arose, because the Court stated
that "since the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the exchange of
fish was an aboriginal right of the Sto:lo it is unnecessary to consider the
tests for extinguishment, infringement and justification laid out by this
Court in Sparrow.... ."I' Nonetheless, the majority of Supreme Court
judges, in the absence of any evidence on the point, proceeded to develop
and expand upon the test of justification first set out in Sparrow. In an
extraordinary ruling, their conclusions have been described by a dissent-
ing member of that same bench as both unnecessary and in themselves
unconstitutional. Writing in dissent, Justice McLachlin spoke in Van der
Peet of her discomfort with the majority decision:
I have argued that the broad approach to justification proposed by the
Chief Justice does not conform to the authorities, is indeterminate, and is,
in the final analysis unnecessary. Instead, I have proposed that justifiable
limitation of aboriginal rights should be confined to regulation to ensure
their exercise conserves the resource and ensures responsible use. There
remains a final reason why the broader view ofjustification should not be
accepted. It is, in my respectful opinion, unconstitutional.
The Chief Justice's proposal comes down to this. In certain circum-
stances, aboriginals may be required to share their fishing rights with
non-aboriginals in order to effect a reconciliation of aboriginal and
non-aboriginal interests. In other words, the Crown may convey a portion
of an aboriginal fishing right to others, not by treaty or with the consent of
the aboriginal people, but by its own unilateral act. I earlier suggested that
this has the potential to violate the Crown's fiduciary duty to safeguard
aboriginal rights and property. But my concern is more fundamental. How,
without amending the Constitution, can the Crown cut down the aboriginal
right? The exercise of the rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) is subject to
reasonable limitation to ensure that they are used responsibly. But the
rights themselves can be diminished only through treaty and constitutional
amendment. To reallocate the benefit of the right from aboriginals to
non-aboriginals, would be to diminish the substance of the right that
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees to the aboriginal people.
This no court can do.35
There is another fundamental unfairness in the manner in which the
Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly approached the issue of justi-
fication. Where Crown evidence of justification has not been presented
34. Supra note 14 at 571.
35. Ibid. at 667 [emphasis added].
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at trial, the Court has frequently referred the case back to trial for further
Crown evidence to be presented, even where the aboriginal accused has
successfully proven a s. 35 right, citing the absence of clear rules for the
Crown to follow at the time of the trial. The most recent examples are in
Gladstone36 and R. v. Badger. 37 In Badger, a new trial was ordered so that
the Crown could introduce evidence ofjustification, the Court stating that
"[i]n the absence of such evidence, it is not open to this Court to supply
its own justification."38 This raises the question of whether the Court
should be looking for justification in the absence of evidence, or whether
it should be determining that in the absence of evidence from the Crown
on an essential element of its case, an acquittal might be more appropriate
given the nature of the quasi-criminal proceedings involved.
In Gladstone, where some evidence ofjustification had been presented
by the Crown, the Court actually directed a new trial so that the Crown
could present more evidence of justification since that which the govern-
ment had put forward was deemed insufficient to meet the new test. The
Court observed that:
The lack of evidence is problematic with regards to both aspects of the
Sparrow analysis. First, in so far as an evaluation of the government's
objective is concerned, no witnesses testified, and no documents were
submitted as evidence, with regards to the objectives pursued by the
government in allocating the herring, and the herring spawn on kelp,
amongst different user groups. As was noted above, there was evidence
presented about the selection criteria used by the Department of Fisheries
and Oceans in allocating herring spawn on kelp licences in 1975; however,
no evidence was presented as to how or why those selection criteria were
chosen or applied. Also, the evidence does not indicate whether those
selection criteria changed over time (not all licences were allocated in
1975) or whether the emphasis placed on the different criteria varied. Clear
evidence was presented at trial demonstrating that setting the total herring
catch at 20% was directed at conservation, but no evidence was presented
regarding the objectives sought to be attained in allocating that 20%
amongst different user groups....
Other evidentiary problems exist with regards to the priority analysis.
There is no evidence as to how, between the different aboriginal bands
holding Category J licences, allocation decisions are made. There is no
evidence as to how, or to whom, the remaining 2,051 tons of herring spawn
on kelp is allocated after the 224 tons of herring spawn on kelp is allocated
to Category J licences. There is also no evidence as to how many aboriginal
36. Supra note 16.
37. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 823, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 324 [hereinafter Badger cited
to S.C.R.]: "[T]he issue of justification was not considered by the courts below. Therefore a
new trial must be ordered so that the issue of justification may be addressed."
38. Ibid. at 822.
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groups live in the region of the herring spawn on kelp fishery, what
percentage aboriginal peoples are of the population in that region, and the
size of the Heiltsuk Band relative to other aboriginal groups and the
general population in the region....
Obviously a new trial will not necessarily provide complete and
definitive answers to all of these questions; however, given that the parties
simply did not address the justifiability of the government scheme, other
than the setting of the herring catch at 20% of the total herring stock, a new
trial will almost certainly provide the court with better information than
currently exists. Prior to Sparrow it ivas not clear what the government,
or parties challenging government action, had to demonstrate in order to
succeed in s. 35(1) cases; this lack of clarity undoubtedly contributed to
the deficiency of the evidentiary record in this case. A new trial on the
question of justification will remedy this deficiency.3 9
In other words, while evidence had been presented in addressing the
Crown's burden of proof in a quasi-criminal proceeding, that evidence
had been insufficient to meet the Crown's burden of proof. Instead of
directing an acquittal, however, the Court sent the matter back for the
Crown to take a second kick at the cat. This is an extraordinary result in
light of the purpose of a criminal prosecution which as stated by the same
court in R. v. Stinchcombe, is "not to obtain a conviction", but to present
"what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is
alleged to be a crime."4 Even in Sparrow, the trial judge had found
Crown evidence inadequate to meet the test of justification:
Before the trial, defence counsel advised the Crown of the intended
aboriginal rights defence and that the defence would take the position that
the Crown was required to prove, as part of its case, that the net length was
justifiable as a necessary and reasonable conservation measure. The trial
judge... did, however find that the evidence called by the appellant
"[c]asts some doubt as to whether the restriction was necessary as a
conservation measure. More particularly, it suggests that there were more
appropriate measures that could have been taken if necessary; measures
that would not impose such a hardship on the Indians fishing for food. That
case was not fully met by the Crown. 4'
Nonetheless, in Sparrow itself, the leading case on aboriginal rights, the
Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial to determine whether
infringement existed and whether it was "nonetheless consistent with s.
35(1)",42 thus giving the Crown another opportunity to prove justifica-
39. Gladstone, supra note 16 at 776-77 [emphasis added].
40. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 at 333, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 97 [hereinafter Stinchcombe cited to
S.C.R.J.
41. Supra note 4 at 1120 [emphasis added].
42. lbid.at1121.
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tion (and another chance to convict) in circumstances where it was
apparent that the issues had indeed been addressed at trial and the Crown
had been unable to answer them.
However, where the defence has not met the proof of an aboriginal
right at trial because of new tests developed by the Supreme Court of
Canada at the appellate level, the Court has not sent the matters back for
new defence evidence according to the new tests, but has convicted the
accused.
For example, in Van der Peet, having reviewed the evidence and
determined that Mrs. Van der Peet failed to meet a test which had not
existed at the time she faced trial, the Court upheld her conviction rather
than ordering a new trial. Mrs. Van der Peet was given no opportunity to
argue issues which had not been considered by the lower courts or to
present evidence at a new trial. In fact, the Supreme Court did not even
consider that the defence might have liked an opportunity to address its
mind to a new evidentiary test, given that the Supreme Court attributed
the deficiencies of the lower court decision to the fact that it was rendered
before the Supreme Court of Canada formulated the appropriate test. The
Supreme Court stated:
In adjudicating this case Scarlett Prov. Ct. J. obviously did not have the
benefit of direction from this Court as to how the rights recognized and
affirmed by s. 35(1) are to be defined, with the result that his legal analysis
of the evidence was not entirely correct.. .4
In R. v. Howard,' members of the Williams Treaties of 192345 were held
by the Supreme Court of Canada to have had their rights extinguished as
a result of a land surrender, a result which differed from the conclusions
reached in the later decision of R. v. Adams" involving a similar
surrender. An application by the accused in Howard to have the Supreme
Court re-hear the matter, based on the decision in Adams, was refused. An
application by the Appellant, Dorothy Van der Peet, for a new trial to
present evidence in accordance with the new tests set out in Van der Peet
was refused at the same time.47
43. Van der Peer, supra note 14 at 566 [emphasis added].
44. [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 312 [hereinafter Howard].
45. Williams Treaty of 1923, reproduced in R.A. Reiter, The Law of Canadian Indian
Treaties (Edmonton: Juris Analytica, 1995) at 213-20.
46. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 657 [hereinafter Adams cited to S.C.R.].
47. Personal communications, Bill Henderson, appellate counsel in Howard. Both applica-
tions were dismissed on 16 January 1997.
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It is difficult to understand why in each case where the lower courts
have not had the benefit of directions from the Supreme Court, the Court
has directed a new trial, to allow the Crown to present additional evidence
to meet its burden of proof, but the accused has been denied the same
opportunity.
Other issues arise from Sparrow. As a result of the shifting burden of
proof, the Crown' sjustification evidence cannot be characterized as reply
evidence, since it is presented in response to the defence having estab-
lished a prima facie historical right to engage in certain practices and
before the defence has called any evidence on the management or
regulatory scheme in place. During the justificatory leg of the trial, the
Crown supposedly bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the defence may or may not respond with expert or other evidence of
its own in reply.
With the burdens of proof currently contemplated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Sparrow, a trial must proceed in a number of stages,
each with rights of reply and surrebuttal and without clear direction as to
the degree or timing of Crown disclosure with regard to each phase. 8
Even then, it appears the burden of disclosure rests with the accused and
not with the Crown since it is the accused who must present historical
evidence supporting the aboriginal or treaty right first, thereby giving the
Crown an opportunity to retain experts to review the defence evidence
andrespond. Mostrecently, in R. v. Finta,4 9 the Supreme Court stated that
the Crown did not need to disclose expert evidence it intended to call as
reply evidence prior to trial, even where the defence had disclosed its
defence, so long as the defence was provided with a right of surrebuttal.
The Court did not comment on the requirement that the Crown provide
full disclosure prior to calling such evidence in accordance with its own
decision in R. v. Stinchcombe ° The practical result of this is that the
Crown has full disclosure of the defence historical evidence before it is
called on to present historical evidence of its own, but is not required to
disclose its own materials or expert evidence until it elects to present reply
evidence.
48. (1) The Crown must prove aprimafacie offence; (2) the defence must prove the aboriginal
or treaty right on the balance of probabilities; (3) the Crown may prove extinguishment of the
right but must do so to the strict proof, or beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the defence must prove
interference with the right amounting to prima facie infringement, and (5) the Crown must
prove justification for the infringement to the strict proof, or beyond a reasonable doubt.
49. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 513 [hereinafter Finta cited to S.C.R.].
50. Supra note 40.
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Where new issues are raised through that reply evidence, the defence
is called on to respond by presenting further evidence in surrebuttal, or to
recall its initial witnesses, who are then exposed for a second time to
cross-examination on evidence presented long before. This is precisely
what happened in R. v. Decaire,5" a trial relating to fishing charges in
which a s. 35 defence was raised. After the close of the defence expert
evidence of an aboriginal and treaty right, the Crown obtained a ten month
adjournment to locate an expert to respond to the defence evidence. It was
then granted a second eight month adjournment after the Crown's first
expert witness had testified in order to find a second expert to address
issues which the first Crown expert had not dealt with satisfactorily. Both
Crown experts raised new issues which had not been the subject of
cross-examination during the defence evidence-in-chief, requiring the
defence to re-call its expert witness, who was then subjected to
cross-examination on evidence given almost two years earlier. This was
done despite defence objections. 5 2
When the Supreme Court of Canada set out the burdens of proof in
Sparrow, it appears that the Court did not consider the heavy onus which
would be placed on aboriginal parties, or the Charter implications of
reversing the onus of proof in s. 35 situations. Nor have any subsequent
cases since raised the issue.
The tests developed by the Supreme Court of Canada to deal with such
cases invoke a reverse onus of proof on the accused, to be proven on the
balance of probabilities. Such procedures may in themselves be uncon-
stitutional in light of the Supreme Court's conflicting rulings to the effect
that any provision creating an offence which allows imprisonment
notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt on any essential
element violates both ss. 7 and 11 (d) of the Charter.53 Reverse onus
sections in the Criminal Code54 have been held to be unconstitutional as
an infringement on the presumption of innocence in s. 11 (d) of the
Charter.51 It remains to be answered how it is that the shifting burden of
proof outlined by Sparrow can be reconciled with s. 11 (d).
51. R. v. Decaire (3 February 1997), (Ont. Prov. Div.) [unreported].
52. In Decaire, ibid. the Crown Submissions in support of the Admissibility of Dr. Surtee's
Evidence specifically stated that Dr. W.J. Eccles, the first Crown witness, had not given
opinions in the area he had been requested to, and therefore an additional expert was required,
paras. 11-13.
53. R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 at 655-56,47 D.L.R. (4th) 399; Re s. 94(2) of the
Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group
Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
54. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
55. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,26 D.L.R. (4th) 200,24 C.C.C. 321 [hereinafter Oakes].
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Certainly, the shifting of an onus of proof within a statute can be
demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter, but s. 35 rights do
not form part of Part I of the Constitution Act and are not subject to a s. 1
limitation. This was the subject of comment by Justice McLachlin in her
dissent in Van der Peet:
Put another way, the Chief Justice's approach might be seen as treating the
guarantee of aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) as if it were a guarantee of
individual rights under the Charter. The right and its infringement are
acknowledged. However, the infringement may be justified if this is in the
interest of Canadian society as a whole. In the case of individual rights
under the Charter, this is appropriate because the Charter expressly states
that these rights are subject to such "reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
However, in the case of aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the
Constitutional Act, 1982 [sic], the framers of s. 35(1) deliberately chose
not to subordinate the exercise of aboriginal rights to the good of society
as a whole. In the absence of an express limitation on the rights guaranteed
by s. 35(1), limitations on them under the doctrine of justification must
logically and as a matter of constitutional construction be confined, as
Sparrow suggests, to truly compelling circumstances, like conservation,
which is the sine qua non of the right, and restrictions like preventing the
abuse of the right to the detriment of the native community or the harm of
others--in short, to limitations which are essential to its continued use and
exploitation. To follow the path suggested by the Chief Justice is, with
respect, to readjudicially the equivalent of s. 1 into s. 35(1), contrary to the
intention of the framers of the constitution.56
There has been no argument addressed as to why a justificatory test
analogous to that contained in s. 1 should apply to aboriginal cases,
particularly given that the Constitution itself does not suggest such a
restriction. The limits placed on aboriginal rights in terms of a justifica-
tory test originate not from any statute or from the Constitution, as noted
by Justice McLachlin, but from the Supreme Court of Canada. Similarly,
the requirement that an accused aboriginal person prove that his or her
s. 35 rights have been prima facie infringed in order to invoke s. 52
protection cannot be found in any statute.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held in other cases that at minimum,
the presumption of innocence requires that the accused be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and that it is the state which bears the burden
of proof.57 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the real concern
is not that the accused must disprove an element or prove an excuse, but
56. Supra note 14 at 662-63.
57. Oakes, supra note 55.
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that an accused person might be convicted while a reasonable doubt
exists. Where that possibility exists, the presumption of innocence is
infringed. 8 In such cases, the issue then becomes whether the provision
can be justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit "prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The Supreme Court in Sparrow directed that:
[T]he Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government
and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary
recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of
this historic relationship. 9
It is extremely difficult to see how a reverse onus of proof on aboriginal
parties can constitute a reasonable limit prescribed by law when it is
simply an onus imposed by the Court itself. Indeed, if the government
attempted to introduce regulations or rules which created a reverse onus
of proof on aboriginal parties within federal or provincial statutes, it is
extremely doubtful that these could pass the justificatory test set out in
Sparrow, much less the requirements of criminal law. The objective
behind the reverse onus must be closely connected with the purpose of the
offence itself to be constitutional. For example, in R. v. Keegstra,60 the
reverse onus in the Criminal Code requiring the accused to prove the truth
of his statements was held to be a reasonable limit since otherwise, the
pressing and substantial objective of Parliament in preventing harm from
hate propaganda would suffer unduly. But a requirement that the aborigi-
nal parties to a prosecution prove that they are entitled to invoke s. 35 by
placing the onus of proving the right on them is inconsistent with the
principles of affirmation and recognition set out in Sparrow; indeed, it is
inconsistent with the fiduciary duty on the Crown that the Crown uphold,
recognize and affirm such rights:
There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court or
any court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that
restricts aboriginal rights. Yet, we find that the words "recognition and
affirmation" incorporate thefiduciary relationship referred to earlierand
so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power.6 1
There are further issues of unfairness related to the onus of proof. Since
the decision in Van der Peet, it is beyond question that the onus of proof
of an aboriginal right lies upon the accused. But the Supreme Court has
58. R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3,51 D.L.R. (4th) 481,42 C.C.C. (3d) 97 and R. v. Keegstra,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 61 C.CC. (3d) I [hereinafter Keegstra].
59. Supra note 4 at 1108 [emphasis added].
60. Keegstra, supra note 58.
61. Supra note 4 at 1109 [emphasis added].
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not ruled on the burden of proof in a treaty case, where it would seem that
the Crown, as a party to the treaty, should bear the burden of proving its
inapplicability, rather than the aboriginal party, as would be the case if
any other contract were involved.62 In Penasse,63 a decision rendered
well before the Constitution Act, 1982, a lower court held that in the
absence of a specific reverse onus within legislation, the burden of
proving that a treaty right did not protect the activity in question lay with
the Crown. Judge Lunney of the Provincial Court of Ontario, Criminal
Division held that where the sale of fish was involved, a reverse onus
section within the Ontario Game and Fish Act which placed the onus on
an accused where prosecuted for "taking, killing procuring or possessing
fish" did not apply. As such, the court held:
If the onus were on the defendants under s. 81 it might well be argued that
to make out a defence under the treaty, they would have to show by
evidence what were the actual fishing practices "heretofore" i.e. prior to the
execution of the treaty in 1850 and that the actions of the defendants giving
rise to the present charge against them came within the intent and meaning
of the treaty. The onus on the Crown does not shift, however, and the
evidence must show beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendants are
subject to the provisions of s. 64(2) of the Game and Fish Act, 1961-62 ....
It may be put forward that it is not incumbent on the Crown to negative
any and every possible exception, excuse or exclusion of the provision of
a general statute. To apply this principle here would be to put the cart
before the horse. The treaty preceded the statute. The treaty secures
substantive rights to the defendants. Those rights are theirs unless they
have been subsequently abrogated, derogated from or otherwise dimin-
ished. In the trial of an issue involving Indians asserting rights under such
a treaty where the treaty is older than the statute on which the prosecution
is founded, it would seem that the onus should be on the Crown to show
that the statute abrogated, derogated from or diminished the treaty right
asserted.... In the absence of the availability to the Crown of an onus
section such as s. 81 of the Game and Fish Act, 1961-62, it is up to the
Crown to bring the defendants within the statute and not the other way
about.64
The principles enunciated by the court in Penasse seem more consistent
with the criminal law process than what has developed from Sparrow.
The Crown's overall burden of proof is supposed to be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence for all but the rarest of
62. The author does not suggest that a treaty is a contract in the ordinary sense but the Supreme
Court has indicated that the ordinary rules of proof should apply to extrinsic evidence where
treaties are involved, as if they were contracts, R. v. Horse, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 187,47 D.L.R. (4th)
526, [1988] 2 C.N.L.R. 112.
63. Supra note 3.
64. Ibid. at 572 [emphasis added].
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offences involving absolute liability. In addition, the burden on the
Crown of proving extinguishment of an aboriginal right has been de-
scribed as one of "strict proof', while the Crown's proof of justification,
at least in food fishing cases, has been described as a "heavy onus."65 This
suggests that the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the
Crown at all stages of the trial, even where the reciprocal burden on the
defence is that of a balance of probabilities. Yet there is no Supreme Court
of Canada case involving the prosecution of aboriginal fishing in which
the concept of "reasonable doubt" has even been mentioned. Nor has the
Court characterized such cases as falling within the category of absolute
liability or strict liability offences, a characterization which removes or
alters certain elements, such as mens rea, from the definition of the
offence which the prosecution must prove. Nor could the Court do so, in
light of the defences first set out in Sparrow.
IV. The Specific Requirements of Proof
When the Supreme Court of Canada set out the burdens of proof in
Sparrow, it is evident that some fragmentation of the evidence was
contemplated. A typical prosecution entailing proof of the offence,
defence evidence and Crown reply is not suitable for a Sparrow-type
prosecution. It is not possible for the Crown to put forward reply evidence
of extinguishment before the defence has called proof of an aboriginal
right, and it is not possible for the defence to reply to evidence of
justification before the Crown has presented its evidence in that regard.
The procedural steps invoked in response to Sparrow, however, are
fundamentally unfair to the defence.
V. Prima Facie Proof of the Offence
The Crown needs to present prima facie proof that an offence has
occurred. Such proof is frequently admitted on an Agreed Statement of
Facts in aboriginal and treaty rights cases, where the fact of the offence
is not at issue. Where this is not the subject of agreement, the Crown must
prove that the offence occurred, proving the elements of the offence
according to the same burden of proof that would apply in any criminal
or quasi-criminal proceeding.66 This is not usually very difficult to do
since the issue in aboriginal and treaty rights cases is not that a breach of
65. Ibid.
66. It is suggested that this is so whether the offence is one characterized as quasi-criminal
or regulatory since the failure to make out a prima facie offence must result in an acquittal.
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existing laws or regulations took place, but rather that such laws are
unenforceable due to the provisions of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
However, technical defences as to whether proof of the offence has
been made out, unless resulting in a motion for non-suit, must await final
argument. This means that aboriginal parties must present their s. 35
evidence and argue any technical defences at the end of the trial. If, in fact,
the Crown has failed to establish any requisite element of the offence
beyond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal will result; however, the aborigi-
nal defendants will have been put through the enormous expense of
raising constitutional issues and introducing complex evidence in cir-
cumstances where the merits of the constitutional argument were super-
fluous. The Supreme Court has itself held that if a court can decide a case
without having to consider any constitutional issues, it should do so.67
Once the Crown has proven its prima facie case, as discussed, the
burden of establishing an aboriginal or treaty right shifts to the defence.
There is, at this time, no requirement that the Crown present its justifica-
tory evidence as part of its prima facie case. Although the issue was raised
by the defence in Sparrow, who had put the Crown on notice at trial that
such issues should be addressed by the Crown as part of its primafacie
case, the Court did not make the onus of proof clear, noting only that,
[blefore the trial, defence counsel advised the Crown of the intended
aboriginal rights defence and that the defence would take the position that
the Crown was required to prove, as part of its case, that the net length
restriction was justifiable as a necessary and reasonable conservation
measure.... That case was not fully met by the Crown.68
VI. Defence Requirement of Disclosure
Where an aboriginal or treaty right defence under Sparrow is successful,
legislation or actions 69 which are inconsistent with the right and which
cannot be justified are declared unenforceable as being unconstitutional.
Therefore, where legislation is being challenged, the defence is required
to deliver a Notice of Constitutional Question both to the provincial and
federal Attorneys General as well as the prosecutor with carriage of the
proceedings. The Notice must set out the law to be challenged under s. 52
and the type of aboriginal or treaty rights to be invoked. It is not clear
67. Bisaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60 at 71,7 CCC. (3d) 385; R. v. Skoke-Graham,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 106 at 121-22, 17 C.C.C. (3d) 289.
68. Supranote4at 1120.
69. For example, in Nikal, supra note 8, the Supreme Court declared a specific licence issued
in 1986 to be unconstitutional based on the management scheme in existence at the time.
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whether such a notice is required where it is not the legislation itself, but
an action taken under legislative authority which is challenged. It is
unlikely that such notice would be required where, for example, a fishing
licence and not the legislation under which it was issued was being
challenged by the defence as a prima facie infringement.
The requirements and formalities of notice vary from province to
province and the degree of disclosure depends, for the most part, on which
court is to hear the trial. Under the Criminal Proceedings Rules of
Ontario,7" for example, notice of application and constitutional issue is
required to be made at least 15 days before trial where the application is
to be made at trial and must state the documentary, affidavit and other
evidence to be adduced at the hearing.7' However, the Rules are only
applicable to proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Ontario Court
(General Division), which is a superior court, while most fishing cases
proceed as offences under provincial legislation or under federal regula-
tions to the Fisheries Act.72 These cases are tried before justices of the
peace or provincial judges who are not subject to the Criminal Proceed-
ings Rules.73
There is certainly no obligation on the defence to raise a s. 35 defence
until proof of the offence has been made out at trial. Proof of whether the
Crown has lived up to its obligations under Sparrow, a factor in determin-
ing the constitutionality of the legislation, may not be known until the
Crown has determined whether to call evidence of justification, and
sometimes then not until Crown witnesses have testified and been
cross-examined. As well, in Sparrow-type proceedings, neither the
defence nor the Crown is required to call evidence on certain issues until
a sufficient degree of proof has been adduced by the other side thereby
invoking the other side's burden of proof.
As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. DeSousa,74 a motion
to quash the indictment on grounds of constitutional invalidity may be
brought at any time and the trial judge has the discretion to rule on the
application when brought, or to reserve until the end of the case. Indeed,
the general rule set out by the Supreme Court of Canada is that adjudica-
tion of such issues should not be conducted without a factual basis and the
70. Ontario Court of Justice Criminal Proceedings Rules, SI/92-99, C. Gaz. 1990.11.2298
[hereinafter Criminal Proceedings Rules].
71. Ibid., r. 27.01.
72. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
73. "Proceedings" are defined in the Criminal Proceedings Rules, supra note 70, to include
summary conviction proceedings under s. 785 of the Criminal Code.
74. R.v. DeSousa, [19921 2 S.C.R. 944, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 595.
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trial should not be fragmented by interlocutory proceedings except where
the evidence at trial would not assist in the resolution of the constitutional
issue.
It is apparent that the notice requirement, at least insofar as Ontario is
concerned, is intended to apply to pre-trial applications and hearings in
which constitutional issues will be resolved. Nonetheless, the Courts of
Justice Act75 precludes the Court from ruling on a constitutional issue
unless such notice has been given. This means that the defence must give
the Crown notice of its substantive defence, a situation which should
surely not apply within the context of a criminal or quasi-criminal
prosecution. Procedural rules requiring advance disclosure of the evi-
dence to be presented in support of an aboriginal or treaty right, such as
those outlined in the Criminal Proceedings Rules of Ontario, create a
situation where the defence could be required to disclose to the Crown its
witnesses on issues such as justification which have not yet been raised
by the Crown and, in most cases, before the defence or the Crown know
what that evidence might be. A requirement that the defence disclose its
witnesses prior to trial is inconsistent with Stinchcombe,76 a Supreme
Court of Canada decision confirming that the defence has no obligation
to assist the prosecution and is entitled to assume a purely adversarial
stance.
VII. The Degree of Proof Required for a s. 35 Defence
Unless and until a challenge is raised to the reverse onus of proof, the onus
of proof of an aboriginal or treaty right remains with the defence. This was
described in Calder v. Canada (A.G.) as a degree of proof leading the
Court to conclude that the defence contention that an aboriginal right
exists is "probably more correct than incorrect." '77 However, this does not
mean that the accused's burden of proof is light.
In three British Columbia cases recently decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada dealing with aboriginal commercial harvesting rights,
historical, anthropological and ethno-historical evidence was called by
the defence. In Gladstone, the defence called historical and anthropologi-
cal evidence.78 The defence in N. T. C. Smokehouse called an anthropolo-
75. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
76. Supra note 40.
77. Calder v. Canada (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 415, [1973] 7 C.N.L.R. 91 [hereinafter
Calder cited to S.C.R.], Hall J. (dissenting on other grounds), quoting Milirrpum v. Nabalco
Pty. Ltd. (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141, [1972-73] A.L.R. 65.
78. Gladstone (1993), 80 B.C.L.R. (2d) 133 (C.A.).
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gist and ethnologist.79 In Van der Peet, the defence called an historian and
an expert in social and cultural anthropology.
While the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that proving s. 35
rights should not be impossible, it is submitted that the tests they have
imposed make it virtually so. The Court has stated that the evidentiary
burden on the defence relates to the pre-contact period, and not the
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown. In Van der Peet, the Court stated
as follows:
That this is the relevant time should not suggest, however, that the
aboriginal group claiming the right must accomplish the next to impossible
task of producing conclusive evidence from pre-contact times about the
practices, customs and traditions of their community. It would be entirely
contrary to the spirit and intent of s. 35(1) to define aboriginal rights in such
a fashion so as to preclude in practice any successful claim for the existence
of such a right. The evidence relied upon by the applicant and the courts
may relate to aboriginal practices, customs and traditions post-contact; it
simply needs to be directed at demonstrating which aspects of the aborigi-
nal community and society have their origins pre-contact. It is those
practices, customs and traditions that can be rooted in the pre-contact
societies of the aboriginal community in question that will constitute
aboriginal rights."0
By moving the yardstick back from the assertion of sovereignty to the
pre-contact period, at least so far as aboriginal rights are concerned, the
Court has mandated that the defence produce evidence which may relate
back several centuries. The assertion of sovereignty by the English over
Indian territories took place with the Royal Proclamation of1763.81 First
contact in many parts of Ontario, however, occurred with Jesuit mission-
aries in the 1640s and even earlier in Qufbec82 and eastern Canada.
The Court in Adams described the appropriate period for determining
pre-contact practices as being "the arrival of Samuel de Champlain in
1603 and the consequent establishment of effective control by the French
over what would become New France. ' 83 Effective control over New
France, however, was not achieved until 1701 when the Iroquois agreed
to be neutral in any further contest between the English and French. Early
treaties with aboriginal parties, such as those with the Iroquois described
in R. v. Ireland,84 were entered into in 1701 precisely because the
79. Ibid.
80. Supra note 14 at 555.
81. R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
82. The contemporary record of first contact is set out in the seventy-two volumes of
R. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (New York: Pageant Book,
1959).
83. Supra note 46 at 128.
84. R. v. Ireland (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 577, [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 120 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
40 The Dalhousie Law Journal
European powers, France and England, did not have control or sover-
eignty. Each hoped that by asserting sovereignty over the Iroquois as their
"subjects," they would obtain sovereignty over territory claimed by the
Iroquois as against the other. The Supreme Court of Canada's decisions
render it impossible to determine which test applies: pre-contact (before
European arrival), first contact with the Europeans, or effective control
by the Europeans. Each of these requires significantly different evidence.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the burden of proof should
not be next to impossible to meet, it has created a test which is impossible
to define.
The burden on the accused to prove the right is, at its highest, according
to the "balance of probabilities." However, the tests which the accused
must address in order to meet the burden are overwhelming. In Van der
Peet, the Supreme Court stated that in order to be an aboriginal right, the
practice, custom or tradition must be of central significance to the
aboriginal society in question:
To satisfy the integral to a distinctive culture test the aboriginal
claimant must do more than demonstrate that a practice, tradition or
custom was an aspect of or took place in, the aboriginal society of which
he or she is a part. The claimant must demonstrate that the practice,
tradition or custom was a central and significant part of the society's
distinctive culture. He or she must demonstrate, in other words, that the
practice, tradition or custom was one of the things which made the culture
of the society distinctive--that it was one of the things that truly made the
society what it was.5
And further:
This aspect of the integral to a distinctive culture test arises from the fact
that aboriginal rights have their basis in the prior occupation of Canada by
distinctive aboriginal societies. To recognize and affirm the prior occupa-
tion of Canada by distinctive aboriginal societies it is to what makes those
societies distinctive that the court must look in identifying aboriginal
rights. The court cannot look at those aspects of the aboriginal society that
are true of every human society (e.g., eating to survive), nor can it look at
those aspects of the aboriginal society that are only incidental or occa-
sional to that society; the court must look instead to the defining and
central attributes of the aboriginal society in question. It is only by
focusing on the aspects of the aboriginal society that make that society
distinctive that the definition of aboriginal rights will accomplish the
purpose underlying s. 35(1).86
In the circumstances of Van der Peet, Dorothy Van der Peet, a member
of the coastal Sto:lo tribe, was charged with selling ten fish. Her claim to
85. Supra note 14 at 553 [first emphasis added].
86. Ibid. [second emphasis added].
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as. 35 right to "trade and barter," an activity surely distinctive and integral
to aboriginal societies throughout North America, was held not to be an
aboriginal right on the basis that it was not "distinctive and integral" to
the Sto:lo culture and society.
It appears that the quality of "distinctive and integral" is left to be
determined on the facts of each case.87 The Supreme Court indicated in
Van der Peet that such rights are not general and universal and must be
determined on a case-by-case basis, because the existence of the right is
specific to each community.8" Each community is then forced to place its
history and membership under a microscope in order to prove the
distinctive and integral nature of its values and activities. It is of interest
to ask the question, as has one aboriginal author and academic, ofjust how
many Canadian cultural values and practices could survive such scrutiny. 89
VIII. Proof of Rights which may not be Linked to Land
The Supreme Court has suggested that the basis of aboriginal rights is a
link to the land:
[W]hat section 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies with
their own practices, traditions and cultures9" is acknowledged and recon-
ciled with the sovereignty of the Crown.
... [T]he purpose underlying section 35(1) [is] . . . the protection and
reconciliation of the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the
arrival of Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land
in distinctive societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions;
the test for identifying the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.
35(1) must be directed at identifying the crucial elements of those
pre-existing distinctive societies.91
It seems from Van der Peet that the Supreme Court considered aboriginal
rights to be confined territorially to previously used or occupied lands.
Yet they have stated elsewhere that such rights are severable from
aboriginal title. It is possible to conceptualize some rights which are not
necessarily land-based, such as trade and barter, which may have been
87. A case-by-case analysis was first referred to in Sparrow, supra note 4.
88. Supra note 14 at 559.
89. D. Johnston, "The perspective of an aboriginal person on recent S.C.C. decisions"(Address
to the Canadian Bar Association-Ontario/Canadian Aquatic Resources Society Conference,
Aboriginal Fishing, Traditional Values and Sustainable Resource Development, Wahta
Mohawk First Nation, 29-30 September 1996) [unpublished].
90. Supra note 14 at 539.
91. Ibid. at 548.
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exercised well away from occupied or used lands. For example, the
Nipissing and Huron are known to have traded with the Pitchibourenik,
a people dwelling at the entrance to what the Jesuits described as the great
Bay of the North, "where they procured a great abundance of Beavers in
exchange for hatchets, cleavers, knives and other like commodities,
which they carried thither."92 Whether the great Bay of the North was
Hudson's Bay or James Bay, it was a long way from Huronia and Lake
Nipissing, where these traders lived, yet the trading patterns of both
aboriginal peoples are well-known and distinctive features of their
societies. 93 What link to the land would these nations have to prove in
order to defend their trading practices against prosecution as the exercise
of s. 35 rights?
It is further submitted that the test in Van der Peet places far too much
weight on historical and archival materials as a validation of aboriginal
practices. There are some practices, to use trade and barter again as an
example, which were of only incidental importance to the European
observers because they were ubiquitous,94 but which were distinctive
features of aboriginal societies at large. Where practices were widespread
and commonplace, they were not the subject of interest by European
observers, who noted only what was of importance to them. It is difficult
to understand why the constitutionality of such practices should be
determined based on their importance to those observing them instead of
their importance to those practising them.
Nor is the Supreme Court of Canada consistent in its application of
these tests. Trade and barter in the Van der Peet case was seen as
incidental to other practices and opportunistic, and therefore not pro-
tected. However, in Adams,95 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
use of lands by Mohawks either to fish during periods of warfare or as
hunting grounds, established an aboriginal right:
92. Supra note 82, vol. 45, at 205. Toby Morantz, an historian, believes that this is probably
a reference to trade with the Cree southeast of James Bay; personal communications with
Dr. Victor Lytwyn.
93. The literature supporting the trading networks of the Hurons and Nipissings is immense.
See, for example G. Day, "Nipissing" in B.G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American
Indians: Vol. 15 Northeast (Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1978) at 787-91, and
C. Heidenreich, "Re-establishment of Trade, 1654-1666", Plate 37 in R.C. Harris, ed.,
Historical Atlas of Canada: Vol. 1 From the Beginning to 1800 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1987).
94. Personal communications, Jim Morrison, historian. See also evidence of Dr. Valerius
Geist, zoologist, in R. v. Decaire, supra note 51, Transcript, October 25, 1996. Dr. Geist
testified it was impossible to determine the taxonomies of some species as a result of this deficit
of information.
95. Supra note 46.
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From 1603 to the 1650s the area was the subject of conflict between
various aboriginal peoples, including the Mohawks. During this period,
the Mohawks clearly fished for food in the St. Lawrence River, either
because the Mohawks exercised military control over the region and
adopted the territory as fishing and hunting grounds or because the
Mohawks conducted military campaigns in the region during which they
were required to rely on the fish in the St. Lawrence and Lake St. Francis
for sustenance.
This general picture, regardless of the uncertainty which arises because
of the witnesses' conflicting characterizations of the Mohawks control and
use over this area from 1603 to 1632 supports the trial judge's conclusion
that the Mohawks have an aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St.
Francis. Either because reliance on the fish in the St. Lawrence for food
was a necessary part of their campaigns of war or because the lands of this
area constituted Mohawk hunting and fishing grounds, the evidence
presented at trial demonstrates that fishing for food in the St. Lawrence
River and in particular, in Lake St. Francis, was a significant part of the
life of the Mohawks from a time dating from at least 1603 and the arrival
of Samuel de Champlain into the area. The fish were not significant to the
Mohawks for social or ceremonial reasons; however, they were an impor-
tant and significant source of subsistence for the Mohawks. This conclu-
sion is sufficient to satisfy the Van der Peet test.
96
According to the outcome in Van derPeet, however, it should be Mohawk
warfare that received the benefit of constitutional protection as being
distinctive and integral, and not the incidental use of lands for subsistence
purposes during those military campaigns. Having determined that one
activity which was important (but incidental to other activities) deserved
protection as an aboriginal right, it becomes much more difficult to
understand why the Supreme Court of Canada convicted Dorothy Van
der Peet of selling ten fish on the basis that such trade and barter was
merely incidental and opportunistic to other practices such as potlatch. 97
Nor can one make sense of the Supreme Court's decision to review
Mrs. Van der Peet's activities on the basis of the test they wished to
develop for commercial activities. The Court had itself determined that
the proper characterization of Mrs. Van der Peet's claim was that of trade
and barter, and not commercial or market-based sale:
I would note here by way of illustration that, in my view, both the majority
and the dissenting judges in the Court of Appeal erred with respect to this
aspect of the inquiry. The majority held that the appellant's claim was that
the practice of selling fish "on a commercial basis" constituted an aborigi-
nal right and, in part, rejected her claim on the basis that the evidence did
96. Ibid. at 127-128.
97. See supra note 14 at 567.
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not support the existence of such a right. With respect, this characterization
of the appellant's claim is in error; the appellant's claim was that the
practice of selling fish was an aboriginal right, not that selling fish "on a
commercial basis" was .... 98
That this is the nature of the appellant's claim can be seen through both
the specific acts which led to her being charged and through the regulation
under which she was charged. Mrs. Van der Peet sold ten salmon for $50.
Such a sale, especially given the absence of evidence that the appellant had
sold salmon on other occasions or on a regular basis, cannot be said to
constitute a sale on a "commercial" or market basis. These actions are
instead best characterized in the simple terms of an exchange of fish for
money. It follows from this that the aboriginal fight pursuant to which the
appellant is arguing that her actions were taken is, like the actions
themselves, best characterized as an aboriginal right to exchange fish for
money or other goods.99
However, the Court upheld Mrs. Van der Peet's conviction on the basis
that she had failed to produce sufficient evidence that the tribe had
engaged in commercialized or market-based activities to satisfy the trial
judge. The trial judge's decision, the Court determined, ought not to be
overturned in the absence of palpable error:
This court was not satisfied upon the evidence that aboriginal trade in
salmon took place in any regularized or market sense. Oral evidence
demonstrated that trade was incidental to fishing for food purposes.
Anthropological and archaeological evidence was in conflict. This Court
accepts the evidence of Dr. Stryd and John Dewhurst [sic] in preference to
Dr. Daly and therefore, accepts that the Sto:lo were a band culture as
opposed to tribal. While bands were guided by siem orprominent families,
no regularized trade in salmon existed in aboriginal times. Such trade as
took place was either for ceremonial purposes or opportunistic exchanges
taking place on a casual basis. Such trade as did take place was incidental
only. Evidence led by the Crown that the Sto:lo had no access to salt for
food preservation is accepted.100
Quite apart from the absurdity of requiring evidence of an exchange of
fish for money arising in pre-contact (and therefore pre-money) times, the
Supreme Court first defined what the test of an aboriginal right ought not
to be and then convicted Mrs. Van der Peet for failing to meet it.
It is interesting that in doing so, the Court applied the criminal law
requirement that findings of fact by trial courts should not be reversed in
the absence of error, even as they introduced a new civil standard of proof.
98. Ibid. at 552 [emphasis added].
99. Ibid. at 563 [emphasis added].
100. Reasons of Scarlett Prov. Ct. J., [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 155 at 160, quoted by the Supreme
Court in ibid. at 567 [emphasis added].
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As has been noted, the same judge whose trial facts were upheld in Van
der Peet was found to have applied an incorrect legal analysis to those
facts. Moreover, where a trial judge is dealing with historical "facts," the
appellate court should be in just as good a position as the trial judge to
review the materials filed and draw its conclusion on those facts. The
Court's reasoning, to adopt Justice McLachlin's dissenting analysis in a
slightly different context, "does not conform to the authorities, is indeter-
minate, and is, in the final analysis unnecessary."' 10 '
IX. Something other than Aboriginal Title
While the Supreme Court of Canada has not clearly defined what kinds
of evidence of an aboriginal right will meet the tests set out in Van der
Peet, the Court has at least clarified that aboriginal title is a sub-category
of, and not an interchangeable term for, aboriginal rights." 2 While the
decision is not clear on this point, the Court in Van der Peet stated it was
important not to confuse aboriginal title and aboriginal rights:
As was noted in the discussion of the purposes of s. 35(1), aboriginal
rights and aboriginal title are related concepts; aboriginal title is a
sub-category of aboriginal rights which deals solely with claims of rights
to land. The relationship between aboriginal title and aboriginal rights
must not, however, confuse the analysis of what constitutes an aboriginal
right. Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation of land, but they
also arise from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of
aboriginal peoples on that land. In considering whether a claim to an
aboriginal right has been made out, courts must look at both the relation-
ship of an aboriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, customs and
traditions arising from the claimant's distinctive culture and society.
Courts must not focus so entirely on the relationship of aboriginal peoples
with the land that they lose sight of the other factors relevant to the
identification and definition of aboriginal rights. 03
The elements of proof of aboriginal title were established in a case known
as Baker Lake. 1'4 In Baker Lake, Justice Mahoney of the Federal Court
held that an aboriginal title to territory carries with it the right to move
about and hunt and fish over it. The test of aboriginal title was that the
plaintiffs prove:
101. Ibid.at 667.
102. Ibid. at 562 & 579.
103. Ibid. at 562.
104. Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Min. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)
(1979), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 [hereinafter Baker Lake].
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I. That they and their ancestors were members of an organized society;
2. That the organized society occupied the specific territory over which
they asserted aboriginal title;
3. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies;
and
4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty
was asserted by England.'05
Sparrow did not discuss the Baker Lake test, although it clearly found a
requirement of occupation to the exclusion of other organized societies
to be inapplicable to the aboriginal rights proven by the Musqueam, who
shared the fishing grounds in question with other First Nations.'0 6 As a
result, decisions had conflicted on this issue and the defence was left to
try and prove exclusivity and occupation according to the Baker Lake test.
InAdams,107 the Court finally clarified what it had implied in Van der
Peet; namely, that Baker Lake does not apply to aboriginal rights, and that
the tests of Baker Lake relate to a sub-category of aboriginal rights,
namely aboriginal title.0 8 In making this statement, the Court apparently
reversed that aspect of Baker Lake which held that aboriginal rights were
incidents of aboriginal title, although again, this is not clearly spelled out.
In Adams, the appellant was a Mohawk charged with fishing without
a licence in the St. Regis region of Qudbec. The issue before the Court was
whether the constitutional protection of s. 35(1) extended to aboriginal
customs, practices and traditions which had not achieved legal recogni-
tion under the colonial regime of New France prior to the transition to
British sovereignty in 1763, and where aboriginal title might not exist as
a matter of law. °9 In argument, the Attorney General of Qudbec asserted
among other things that the mere non-exclusive frequentation of a
territory could not serve as the basis for an Indian title or an aboriginal
right, " 0 that the sporadic frequentation of a territory did not possess the
characteristics of permanence and exclusivity necessary for the recogni-
tion of an aboriginal right, and that the occasional frequentation of a
105. Ibid. at 542.
106. The Court noted that ninety-one other tribes, comprising over 20,000 people obtain
their food fish from the Fraser River and some or all of these bands may have an aboriginal right
to fish there, a clear indication that the aboriginal rights may exist where the Baker Lake test
has not been met.
107. Supra note 46.
108. This still raises the question of whether aboriginal title can be a sub-category of
aboriginal rights if aboriginal rights do not require proof of exclusivity and aboriginal title does.
109. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, supra note 81, specifically excluded portions of
Quebec, and there was some issue as to whether the French colonial regime recognized
aboriginal title at all.
110. Argument of the Respondent Attorney General of Quebec in Adams, supra note 46, at 8.
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territory was not sufficient historical possession upon which to base an
aboriginal right. The Attorney General argued that if the ancestors of the
appellant fished in the region of Lake St. Francis, it was in a context other
than that of an aboriginal occupation. As such, it was urged that an
aboriginal fishing right could not be inferred in the absence of a tradi-
tional or historical possession of lands by the community alleging the
right.
The Supreme Court held that aboriginal rights do not require proof of
aboriginal title. Justice Lamer, speaking for the unanimous Court, held
that "while claims to aboriginal title fall within the conceptual framework
of aboriginal rights, aboriginal rights do not exist solely where a claim to
aboriginal title has been made out."'l
However, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Van
der Peet and Adams are anomalous, in that aboriginal title according to
the Baker Lake test requires proof of the requisite elements as at the
assertion of sovereignty. Aboriginal rights, which were supposed to be
incidents of aboriginal title, now require proof from pre-contact times. It
is indeed a strange situation whereby an aboriginal group might have
sufficient proof to establish aboriginal title according to the onerous test
of Baker Lake, and yet be precluded from proving aboriginal rights within
the same territory because their evidence did not reach back to pre-contact
times. If it was the Supreme Court's intention to replace the Baker Lake
test with the new one set out in Van der Peet, it would not have been
necessary for the Court to declare aboriginal rights severable from
aboriginal title, as it suggested in Van der Peet and clarified in Adams.
Baker Lake would simply no longer have been good law. As a result of
Adams, it is no longer clear just what the test of aboriginal title is. Does
it require proof of occupation as at the assertion of sovereignty or from
pre-contact times? Are aboriginal rights still incidents of (and therefore
a sub-category of) aboriginal title or is aboriginal title, as suggested by the
Supreme Court, a sub-category of aboriginal rights? If the latter obtains,
the test for proving aboriginal title becomes more onerous. The Supreme
Court has unfortunately done little more than to add confusion to an area
which was already in some doubt.
While it is also not apparent what degree of occupation is required for
the defence to meet the test in Van der Peet, it is submitted that the defence
should not have to prove exclusive use, which would be required for proof
of aboriginal title. In Nikal,l '2 Mr. Nikal was acquitted of a charge of
111. Ibid. at 14.
112. Supra note 8.
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fishing without a licence even though the Supreme Court of Canada
expressly found that his band had not proven any right to exclusivity
within the fisheries in which Mr. Nikal was fishing. In Sparrow, defence
evidence also indicated that the precise location at issue was shared,
rather than exclusive. The Court noted that,
as part of the Salish people, the Musqueam were part of a regional social
network covering a much larger area but as a tribe, were themselves an
organized social group with their own name, territory and resources.
Between the tribes there was a flow of people, wealth and food. No tribe
was wholly self-sufficient or occupied its territory to the complete exclu-
sion of the others." 3
Exclusivity aside, questions remain despite Van der Peet, N.T.C.
Smokehouse and Gladstone about the extent to which an aboriginal right
must be linked to traditional territories. The Supreme Court did not need
to address itself to this issue, in light of the particular facts of the cases
before it, all of which involved territories occupied by the defendants
since "time immemorial." It seems, however, that actual "occupation," in
the sense of clearing lands and erecting shelters should not be required.
While Adams is vague on this point, the Crown had argued in Adams that
non-permanent occupation of a territory described as a "combat zone"
could not serve as the basis of an aboriginal right."4 In finding that an
aboriginal right had been proven to exist in the territory, as a result of
military campaigns, the Supreme Court implicitly held that it could."5
113. Summary of evidence given by W.P. Suttles, anthropologist, before the B.C. Court of
Appeal, (1986) 9 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300 at 307-308, quoted by the Supreme Court, supra note 4 at
1094.
114. Factum of the Attorney General of Qu6bec, paras. 20, 35-40; Factum of the Attorney
General of Canada, paras. 18-19 in supra note 96.
115. In Adams, supra note 46, the Supreme Court held that the use of lands by Mohawks to
fish either during periods of warfare for subsistence or as hunting grounds established an
aboriginal right. At 127-28:
From 1603 to the 1650s the area was the subject of conflict between various aboriginal
peoples, including the Mohawks. During this period, the Mohawks clearly fished for
food in the St. Lawrence River, either because the Mohawks exercised military control
over the region and adopted the territory as fishing and hunting grounds or because the
Mohawks conducted military campaigns in the region during which they were required
to rely on the fish in the St. Lawrence and Lake St. Francis for sustenance.
This general picture, regardless of the uncertainty which arises because of the
witnesses' conflicting characterizations of the Mohawks' control and use over this area
from 1603 to 1632 supports the trial judge's conclusion that the Mohawks have an
aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St. Francis. Either because reliance on thefish
in the St. Lawrence for food was a necessary part of their campaigns of war or because
the lands of this area constituted Mohawk hunting andfishing grounds.... [emphasis
added]
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X. The Aboriginal Perspective and Oral History
There is no point in discussing a burden of proof without examining
exactly what evidence the party who bears that burden must present in
order to meet it. In the case of aboriginal defendants, the onus of proof
requires that they reach back into pre-contact times and establish the
defining features of their society, as first observed by Europeans. While
the Supreme Court of Canada has referred to oral history and the need to
be sensitive to aboriginal perspectives, it is clear that neither oral history
nor the aboriginal perspective receive much judicial weight unless
validated by observations of Europeans in the form of contemporary
documentary evidence.
In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada referred with approval to the
Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Taylor,'16 a case which held that in
determining the effect of a treaty, it is important to consider the history
and oral traditions of the tribes concerned and the surrounding circum-
stances at the time of the treaty, since "cases on Indian or aboriginal rights
can never be determined in a vacuum." Indeed, in Sparrow,"7 the Court
held that it is crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on
the meaning of the rights at stake, a position adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Van der Peet."" The court also held in Van der Peet
that
a court should approach the rules of evidence and interpret the evidence
that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims,
and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in
times where there were no written records of the practices, customs and
traditions engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence
presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in,
for example, a private law torts case." 9
Oral evidence is frequently the only evidence that can be put forward due
to inadequate or incomplete historical records for certain periods of time.
Indeed, in other contexts, hearsay has been admitted as an exception
where necessary and reliable'20 and where required for full answer and
defence.'2
116. Supra note 19.
117. Supra note 4 at 1112.
118. Supra note 14 at 550.
119. Ibid. at 559.
120. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92.
121. R. v. Miller (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 678 at 692, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 517 (Ont. C.A.). In Finta,
supra note 49, the Court admitted statements made on a solemn occasion by a person with
peculiar knowledge of events as described to a person adverse to the party seeking leave to
tender the evidence.
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However, in virtually all cases in which oral history has been success-
fully used in the context of litigation the aboriginal perspective has been
supported by documents written by Europeans.22 The author has been
unable to locate a single case in which oral history in itself, without some
kind of documentary support-a contradiction in terms-has been suffi-
cient to make out an aboriginal right.
When documentary records prepared by European observers are
required before aboriginal parties can establish pre-contact practices, it is
clear that the test by which an aboriginal right is proven still rests heavily
on eurocentric views. Indeed, this is evidenced in Van derPeet, where the
Court stated:
Having thus identified the nature of the appellant's claim, I turn to the
fundamental question of the integral to a distinctive culture test: Was the
practice of exchanging fish for money or other goods an integral part
of the specific distinctive culture of the Sto:lo prior to contact with
Europeans ?
123
To ask the question in that form is to answer it. The concept of "money
or other goods" as currency is European, not aboriginal. Money would
certainly not have formed a distinctive or integral part of Sto:lo culture
pre-contact, evidencing a test which by its very definition reflects
eurocentric cultural biases.
The Court went on to consider the trial judge's findings that the
"natives did not fish to supply a market" and that "[tirade in dried salmon
with [Fort Langley] was clearly dependent upon the Sto:lo first satisfying
their own requirements for food and ceremony."1 24 Taking no more than
one needs is fundamental to aboriginal culture, yet the Supreme Court has
determined that since the Sto:lo people failed to engage in profit-making,
they had no distinctive, integral trade in fish. This, it is submitted, so
clearly engages European concepts of ownership and commercialization
as to render the test of an aboriginal right to trade virtually impossible to
prove.
The importance of trade to the Sto:lo people according to the aborigi-
nal perspective on the importance of such activities was noted by the
Court but apparently not understood. The Court observed that
122. For example, in R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 3 C.N.L.R. 127 [hereinafter Sioui
cited to S.C.R.], dispatches and minutes of meetings with the Huron Chiefs was accepted as
evidence of a treaty. In Jones, supra note 6, the journal of an observer reporting the statement
of Chief Metigwob to his principal men outlining the terms of a surrender was accepted as
evidence of a treaty.
123. Supra note 14 at 564 [emphasis added].
124. Ibid. at 567.
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such limited exchanges of salmon as took place in Sto:lo society were
primarily linked to the kinship and family relatiqnships on which Sto:lo
society was based.... Mr. Dewhurst testified that the exchange of goods
was related to the maintenance of family and kinship relations.
125
For a culture whose systems of government were founded on kinship,
it is difficult to conceive of what could possibly be considered more
distinctive and integral than the means by which such ties were main-
tained, without which practice, tradition or custom-to apply the Su-
preme Court's own test-the culture would have been other than what it
was. Instead, the Court found that exchanges as part of the interaction of
kin and family were not of independent significance to the culture and
therefore did not suffice to ground a claim to an aboriginal right. In so
doing, the Court revealed a complete ignorance of the foundations of
Sto:lo society and the kinship ties on which it rested.
The Court stated that Sto:lo culture was not defined by a trade in
salmon prior to contact 126 and this is correct. But what the Court ignored
is evidence that the Sto:lo culture was maintained by a trade in salmon,
a trade without which the kinship ties necessary to maintain it would have
deteriorated. As such, it formed a distinctive and integral feature of the
society in question according to the "practical" test set out by the Supreme
Court in the Van der Peet decision itself.
Van der Peet reflects a troubling tendency of the courts to place
enormous weight on the observations of European traders over the views
of aboriginal peoples themselves. In Gladstone, for example, the Su-
preme Court decided that it was satisfied that the band engaged in
inter-tribal trading and barter of herring spawn not because of oral history
or the "aboriginal perspective" that such trading had taken place, but
because it was noted in the 1793 Journal of Alexander MacKenzie and
other early explorers and visitors to the Bella Bella region:
It cannot be disputed that hundreds of years ago, the Heiltsuk Indians
regularly harvested herring spawn on kelp as a food source. The
historical/anthropological records readily bear this out.
I am also satisfied that this Band engaged in inter-tribal trading
and barter of herring spawn on kelp. The exhibited Journal of
Alexander McKenzie [sic] dated 1793 refers to this trade and the
defence lead [sic] evidence of several other references to such trade.
The Crown conceded that there may have been some incidental
local trade but questions its extent and importance. The very fact that
early explorers and visitors to the Bella Bella region noted this
trading has to enhance its significance. All the various descriptions
125. Ibid. at 568.
126. Ibid. at 570.
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of this trading activity are in accord with common sense expecta-
tions. Obviously one would not expect to see balance sheets and
statistics in so primitive a time and setting....
All of this evidence supports the position of the appellants that,
prior to contact, exchange and trade in herring spawn on kelp was an
integral part of the distinctive culture of the Heiltsuk. 27
One must ask, however, why the fact that Europeans observed and
recorded activities somehow enhances the significance of these events, if
the test is whether the activities were "distinctive and integral" to
aboriginal, rather than European, society?
This test places inordinate weight on what Europeans felt was impor-
tant enough to note in their reports and journals. The function of clan
mothers in Iroquois culture and political systems, for example, was (and
is) of fundamental importance to Iroquois society, yet it is not mentioned
once within the Jesuit Relations1 8 or the journals of La Potherie, 2 9
Charlevoix 30 or other early historians of New France. Either they were
not aware of it, or it was not important to them, yet few would argue that
Iroquois society could have functioned as it did in the absence of clan
mothers, whose role included selecting the Confederacy Chiefs.'3 '
Similarly, there is little mention of food fishing in the majority of
journals kept by traders, because the activity was ubiquitous and there-
fore not worthy of note.' Absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence, a point understood by most historians; however, absence of
evidence in a court of law is fatal to the proof of an aboriginal or treaty
right. Furthermore, new information is always coming to light causing
historians to revise their interpretations of historical "fact." Even so, it is
left to aboriginal people to prove that their rights exist through the opinion
of a third party expert, such as an historian or anthropologist, whose
interpretation of their rights will be accepted only if that expert can
produce documentation to verify their oral history. Sensitivity to the
127. Reasons of Lemiski, Prov. Ct. J., quoted in Gladstone, supra note 16 at 743-46 [first
emphasis added].
128. Supra note 82. These were journals kept by Jesuit missionaries in the 1600s.
129. "A Narrative of Remarkable Occurrences" in E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of New York, vols. 9 and 10 (Albany: Weed Parsons, 1856
[microform imprints]).
130. P.F.X. Charlevoix, History and General Description of New France, J.G. Shea, ed.
(New York: Francis P. Harper, 1902).
131. See for example E. Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics and
Ritual" in N.B. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15 (Washington:
Smithsonian Institute, 1978).
132. Dr. Victor Lytwyn, personal communications [on file with the author].
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aboriginal perspective, according to the current tests, first requires
validation from documentary sources reflecting the non-aboriginal
perspective.
It is worth noting that history from an aboriginal perspective as a
subject of academic interest is of relatively recent origin. In 1987, a
French colonial historian, W. J. Eccles, challenged historians to examine
events from the aboriginal point of view. However, as will be discussed,
Dr. Eccles himself has attested that he places little or no weight on
aboriginal oral history. A Provincial Court in Ontario recently held that
Iroquois oral history, where not supported by primary documents, was
"scanty" and entitled to little weight and that an unpublished expert
opinion was not of much use either. The court thereby added yet another
requirement to expert testimony, namely, that it undergo peer scrutiny
before being advanced in court.'33
Having noted that the Supreme Court of Canada held that Mohawk
peoples had aboriginal rights as a result of their military campaigns and
the harvesting activities that took place during such campaigns, the Court
in Decaire'34 held that the Iroquois had failed to prove that they had
engaged in warfare north of Lake Superior. The area at issue was not
known to European observers at the time of such warfare as it involved
a region which Europeans had not yet explored, such that documentary
evidence referring to the specific area at issue was impossible to produce.
Little weight, however, was placed on an aboriginal oral history indicat-
ing that warfare between Iroquois warriors and the Cree and Ojibway of
northern Ontario had taken place north of Lake Superior. The court
stated:
[B]ased on the evidence that goes toward showing on balance the aborigi-
nal right advanced, that is the right of Mr. Decaire to hunt and fish within
areas in which his ancestors had conducted military campaigns or had
occupied or used as a hunting ground, I have the Constance Lake oral
tradition. I must find it scanty. It is also undated, as oral traditions don't
come with dates and in reference to time, usually are said to have occurred
a long time ago. 35
As the Court was aware, in the summer of 1977, archaeologist Christo-
pher Trott had recorded an oral history of Iroquois raids while conducting
archaeological investigations near the confluence of the Cheepay (Ghost)
River and the Albany River of northern Ontario. Trott identified an
archaeological site where arrowheads and burned bone were located and
133. R. v. Decaire, supra note 51.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid. at 8.
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noted that "people at Constance Lake tell a story that a 'battle' between
the local Cree and Iroquois took place in this area."' 36 In 1995, Douglas
Ellis edited a volume of Cree oral history gathered in the 1950s from
elders living on the west coast of Hudson's Bay. It confirmed that
Iroquois warfare had extended into the Hudson's Bay lowlands. One oral
tradition, entitled "How the Ghost River got its name" was told by Cree
elder John Wynn of Fort Albany. He said:
The Iroquois and the [Cree] people must have come to make war on
each other. They had been looking into the future because they wanted to
know how far from each other they were in their approach. So then it was
made known to him (the conjuror) where they were from their forecasting
by their conjurings.
So the people prepared ... to lie in wait for the Iroquois for them to drift
downstream.
And they killed many then by doing this, having foreseen where they
would lie in wait for them. They also took many slaves. And this is the
reason why Ghost River is today called Ghost River.'
Ellis indicated that while Cree oral history takes many forms, the one
relayed in this instance was known as tipacimonwine or acimowina
"which record real or supposedly real events."'38
In yet another oral history, not put before the Court, 13 9 John Silas, an
elder from the James Bay coastal community of Kashechewan is recorded
as having reported an encounter with warring Iroquois in an oral history
taped by John Long at Moose Factory on 26 March 1985 as follows:
One hundred miles upstream from the river we live on, known as the
Albany River, is a place called Ghost River. It was earlier known as the
Sturgeon River....
One time there were thirty men plus women and children camped at the
Sturgeon River. This was at the time when guns were first introduced and
136. C. Trott as quoted in V. Lytwyn, The Hudson's Bay Lowland Cree in the Fur Trade to
1821, A Study in Historical Geography (PhD Dissertation, University of Manitoba, 1993)
[unpublished] at 62.
137. C.D. Ellis, ed., atalohkana nest tipacimowina: Cree Legends and Narratives from the
West Coast of James Bay (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1995) at 177.
138. Ibid. at xxi. Ellis also noted that "the Iroquois were reported to tunnel under the river
banks and come up suddenly in the settlement surprising the people and felling them with
arrows, spears and tomahawks, and that many of the small creeks and gullies running to the
bank are attributed'to tunnelling operations of the Iroquois in a bygone age." The presence of
such pits and trenches was noted as recently as 1906 near Mattawapik Falls, Temagami River,
"where the Iroquois lay in ambush for their enemies, the Ojibways, as they passed down the
river on their way to the trading posts," Diary of James Bay Treaty (no.9), summer of 1906,
Samuel Stewart, National Archives of Canada, RG 10, vol. 11, 399, file 2 (microfilm reel
T-6924).
139. This oral history was located after the ruling in Decaire, supra note 51.
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used by the people; they had begun to replace the bow and arrow by this
time. It was while they were at this camp that one of the men from one of
the families set out in his canoe. He paddled up the Sturgeon River to visit
others who were camped further upstream, inland on another river. The
river they were camped on was called Momoowimatawao, known today as
the English River. There was another branch of the river nearby where
these people were living, also trapping fish with the weir. This far upstream
the river banks were quite high. As the paddler rounded a bend on the river,
he saw canoes which were very large. He knew that these people were
strangers because they never made canoes as large as the ones he saw.
Quickly, unseen, he turned his canoe around. He beached his canoe a
safe distance away and returned on foot to take a closer look. When he got
closer, he quietly scouted the camp to investigate this [sic] sound. He had
never heard such a cry of a person in agony; because of this he was very
cautious. There, before his eyes, he saw the people responsible for this
agony. These were the ones called Natoowaywuk (Iroquois)."4
Silas described an ambush set by the Cree for the Iroquois raiders which
resulted in the Sturgeon River becoming known as Ghost River, "because
of the ambush and the common sight of bones, usually after spring
break-up. Then why not call this place Ghost River? Was this not the place
where many perished?"14'
The time period "when guns were first introduced and used by the
people" places the oral history of warfare at Ghost River within the late
1600s. Iroquois warriors defeated the Hurons and other nations in the
period known as the Great Dispersal (1648-1653) with the advantage of
firearms obtained from their Dutch allies, which these other nations did
not yet have.
In September 1668, representatives of the Hudson's Bay Company
settled at the mouth of Rupert's River at what became known as Charles
Fort. The English traders made several trips inland visiting camps of
Nodways [Iroquois], Kilistinons [Cree] and others, commenting that
these "Indians use bow and arrows, living in tents which they move from
one place to another."1 42 In fact, Thomas Gorst, the Hudson's Bay's
accountant postulated that the Indians of the Bay with whom he spoke had
been driven north by the Iroquois since "the Indians at the Bottom of the
Bay, like the rest is [sic] distinguished by several dialects."
140. J. Wesley, Stories from the James Bay Coast, N. Wesley & A. Faries, eds. (Ontario:
Highway Book Shop, 1996) at 1-8.
141. Ibid. at 9.
142. C. Bishop, "The First Century: Adaptive Changes Among the Western James Bay Cree
Between the Early Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries" in S. Krech, ed., The Subarctic
Fur Trade: Native Social and Economic Adaptations (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1984) at 26.
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Defence evidence established that in 1671-72, the Iroquois extended
their raids to the north and were at that time reported to be at Lake
Nemiscau, a mere eighty miles east of Charles Fort. 43 By the winter of
1672-1673, Jesuit missionaries expressed concern that Iroquois and
Mississauga warriors were hunting together in the territory of Hudson's
Bay.'" In 1674, the Jesuits reported that Iroquois warriors were in the
vicinity of Lake Mistassini and "fear reigned everywhere.' 1 45 Ottawas
coming with furs from the neighbourhood of Lake Superior had been
ambushed twice by Iroquois warriors on their way to Montrdal.
146
The Iroquois wars had severed trade relations between the Moose
River Cree and their trading partners, the Nipissing, and had driven some
Algonquin groups to the shores of James Bay. 147 The court was apprised
of warfare at Moose River involving Cree and Iroquois. John Oldmixen,
a contemporary observer, reported that "as they passed Moose River,
about ten day's journey from Rupert's [Rupert's House, the Hudson's
Bay Company Post], they saw some dead bodies of Indians which they
supposed to be Onachanoes, most of that nation being destroyed by the
Nottaways [Iroquois]." The Moose River Cree usually wintered in the
area northwest of Lake Superior.'4 8
In 1674, the "Nodways" (the Cree term for Iroquois, meaning "en-
emy") were threatening the Indians who traded at Rupert's River. This
group of "Nodways" were reported to be wintering just south of James
Bay. 149
While the oral history of warfare may be undated, the contextual
information supplied to the Court identified the time period fairly clearly.
Moreover, if an oral history supported by contextual information con-
tained in the Jesuit Relations, confirmed by a contemporary observer,
repeated by elders from different communities and supported by physical
evidence at an archaeological site is considered "scanty," it is difficult to
imagine what oral history will ever meet the test of sufficiency.
As well, it is important to be aware that historians themselves may be
biased against oral history, and accord it little weight in their testimony.
W. J. Eccles, for example, testified on behalf of the Crown in Decaire. At
issue was a treaty entered into in 1700 and ratified in 1701 at Montr6al in
which the defence suggested an agreement had been reached among
143. Ibid. at 28.
144. Supra note 82, vol. 57 at 21-23.
145. Ibid. vol. 59 at 39.
146. Ibid. vol. 49 at 245.
147. Bishop, supra note 142.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid. at 28.
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aboriginal nations to share hunting grounds. Dr. Eccles testified there was
no evidence of such an agreement within the historical record. 50
The Minutes of the Montreal treaty involving the French, Five Nations
and a number of French Indian allies, as translated by Dr. Eccles, reflect
the presentation by Iroquois Chiefs of a series of porcelain collars, or
wampum belt. Such belts were the means by which Iroquois peoples
recorded their speeches. The second and sixth belt stated:
When we came here the last time we planted the tree of peace, now you
plant the roots that will extend to the western nations. In order that it should
be strengthened, we hereby add the leaves so that in their shade we can
discuss our affairs more agreeably...
The last time we spoke together here we gave gifts to the Algonquins
because we had spent the winter hunting; they spoke with us again later and
told us that since Onontio [the French Governor] joined us together in
peace we should eat our meat together when we encountered each other;
they told us that they would be here when we returned, but since none of
them are here, here is a collar that I place down to thank them and tell them
that we desire nothing better than to share a common cooking pot when we
encounter each other. 5'
The metaphor of the "tree of peace" and "common cooking pot," or "dish
with one spoon," appeared in the historical record with remarkable
consistency over the next two hundred years with reference to the
Montreal agreement. On 7 April 1757, Thomas Butler wrote of a meeting
between the French and the Iroquois on 18 March 1757:
They Inds Said we Cant write but know all that has past between us having
Good Memories. After the Warrs & troubles we together met you at this
place where Every trouble was burred & a fire kindled here. Where was To
Meet and Treat peaceably; you are now working Distbances and Seem to
Forget the old agreemt. &c: The Tree semes to be falling, let it be now put
up the Roots spread and the leves flowrish as before. you formerly said.
take this bool and this meat with this Spoon let us Eat allways frindly
together out this one Dish...51
In 1765, Daniel Claus, Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs, wrote to Sir
William Johnson, stating the "Cognawageys" (the Iroquois of
Caughnawaga) wished Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to
remind those Nations [the Mohawks, Oneidas and Onondagas] of the old
Agreement made before the French Governor many Years ago, in the
Presence of the Five Confederate [Five Nations] and all the other Nations
150. Transcript (2 April 1996), Decaire, supra note 51.
151. W.J. Eccles, Translation of the Montrdal 1700 Peace Negotiations [unpublished].
152. Letter from Thomas Butler (7 April 1757) in The Papers of Sir William Johnston, vol. 2
(Albany: University of New York, 1922) at 705.
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in Canada. That when a general Peace was made and concluded between
these Nations, the Governor told them that as they were become one body
and one mind, the Woods and Hunting Grounds could be no otherwise than
common, and free to one nation as to another, in the same manner as a large
Dish of Meat would be to a company of People who were invited to eat it,
when every Guest had liberty to cut as he pleased, wherefore they hoped
you would make these Nations abide by this agreement.' 53
In 1765, Daniel Claus reported that he had attended a meeting of the
Iroquois at Caneghsady [Kanestake], where the latter expressed their
wish to
... renew the old Agreemt made by their forefathers which was that all the
Nations in Canada should enjoy a free hunting wherever they thought
proper that there should be no claim of property of any particular Spot but
all Indns in General should equally enjoy the Liberty of hunting in the
woods wch their wise forefathers concerted and agreed upon.... And
therefore gave them their advice to use the Wood with the same freedom
as they would a Kettle with Victuals when invited to a feast and with one
Spoon & one Knife to eat all together sociably & without begrudging those
that had a better appetite & eat more than the others.- 4
In 1793, Iroquois spokesman Joseph Brant remembered the 1701 confer-
ence, stating that:
Upwards of one hundred years ago a moon of Wampum was placed in this
Country with four Roads leading to the Centre for the convenience of
Indians from Different Quarters to come and settle or hunt here a Dish with
one Spoon was likewise put here with the moon of Wampum, this shews
that my Sentiments respecting the Lands are not New.'55
Peter Jones, an Ojibway missionary reported in 1840 that Iroquois Chief
John Buck, an Onondaga, 5 6 had apparently made a speech:
[He] exhibited the wampum belts, the memorials of the old treaties and
explained the talks contained in them. There were four belts, or string of
wampum. The first contained the first treaty made between the Six Nations
and the Ojebways. This treaty was made many years before.... The belt
was in the form of a dish or bowl in the centre which the chief said
represented that the Ojebways and the Six Nations were all to eat out of the
same dish; that is, to have all their game in common.'57
153. Extract of a letter from Daniel Claus, Esq. Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs in Canada,
to Sr. Wm. Johnson (Montr6al, 30 August 1765) in The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol. 11
(Albany: University of New York, 1953).
154. Journal of Daniel Claus (4 October 1767) in The Papers of Sir William Johnston, vol. 13
(Albany, University of New York: 1962) at 431.
155. Letter of Joseph Brant to Alexander McKee (4 August 1793) in E.A. Cruikshank, ed.,
The Correspondence of Lieut. Gov. John Graves Simcoe, vol. 5 (Toronto: Ontario Historical
Society, 1931) at 66-67.
156. Onondaga being one of the nations forming the Five, and later Six Nations.
157. History of the Ojebway Indians (London: A.W. Bennett, 1861) at 119.
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In 1887, an archaeologist, Dr. David Boyle was shown a wampum belt
from the conference. Chief Buck, the Iroquois firekeeper explained:
Chief Buck, on whom devolved the highest office in the gift of the
Iroquois, that of firekeeper, had it as his duty never to let them out of his
sight, day or night.... The firekeeper told the first belt, all white except
a round purple patch in the centre. This represents all the Indians on the
continent. They have entered into one great league and contract that they
will be all one and have one heart. The pot in the centre is a dish of beaver,
indicating that they will have one dish and what belongs to one will belong
to all. The second strip was a long narrow one of white. This strip was made
in token of peace that was then made between tribes on the continent. 5"
Dr. Eccles, on being presented with this evidence reflecting a remarkably
consistent interpretation of the Montreal treaty, dismissed the accounts as
unreliable, stating that "Well, you're putting far more emphasis on the
validity of an Indian in 1887 to interpret a wampum belt from 1701 than
I would. I prefer to rely on the documents themselves."' 15 9
The aboriginal perspective on such histories and mnemonic guides
such as wampum belts is, of course, that they should be accorded weight
in and of themselves. The notion that these oral histories require "inde-
pendent validation" by experts who may not understand the aboriginal
perspective or who may have had their own biases or points of view, is
in itself eurocentric. In many instances, it calls for an impossible level of
proof in that written records may not exist, or where they do exist, may
not have been the subject of academic interest.
For example, it has been repeatedly held that aboriginal accuseds must
prove themselves to be part of an "organized society" to prove aboriginal
rights. However, anthropologist Charles Bishop writes:
Although the origins of present conditions are of considerable interest to
anthropologists, the reconstruction of lifeways at the moment of external
influence is of no easy task. Both archival and archaeological data are very
incomplete, and there has been little collaboration between prehistoric
archaeologists and historically minded ethnologists in the Northern
Algonquin area, partly because intensive archaeology and ethnohistory
only began in the 1960s. 6°
In most of Ontario and northern Manitoba, the Iroquois wars themselves
resulted in major dislocations of tribal groups in the post-contact period:
158. D. Boyle, "What is Wampum? Explained by Chief John Buck, Firekeeper, June 20,
1887" in Ontario,ArchaeologicalReport, Appendix to the Report of the Ministerof Education,
Ontario (Toronto: King's Printer, 1929) at 48-50.
159. Transcript (2 April 1996), Decaire, supra note 51 at 32, lines 20-25.
160. Supra note 142 at 22.
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Beginning with the historical information, most evidence that we have
for tribal distribution during the early historic period, i.e., the 17th century,
comes from the records of Jesuit priests and French explorers. The early
Algonkian-speakers north of the Great Lakes are named and located,
although it is only with much difficulty that we are able to tie early historic
appellations with their modem representatives. This is due to the major
population shifts precipitated by the Iroquois wars and the fur trade which
led to movements and mixing of groups so that by the middle of the
eighteenth century, many original tribal and group designations were lost.
Therefore, various Algonkian groups in northern Ontario today must be
understood as blends and amalgamations of earlier distinct groups. 6'
Since much of the historical and anthropological research in this field is
yet to be done, previously unknown archival information casting new
light on aboriginal rights and providing insight into individual aboriginal
societies is being located and identified every day. The Imperial Procla-
mation of 1847,162 for example, on which the Chippewas of Nawash
relied in R. v. Jones163 in establishing a treaty promise to commercial
fishing rights in the Great Lakes was discovered by the Fisheries
Resource Co-ordinator for the band in 1991, and had not been previously
identified by any historian as of significance to aboriginal rights in the
fisheries. 64
When historical documentary evidence is the only accepted basis on
which such rights may be proven, and not all the existing archival or
documentary materials have been examined, understood or catalogued
by scholars, the danger in taking materials out of context or determining
that there is "no evidence" to support aboriginal and treaty rights should
be evident. In such circumstances, there is no good reason why written
historical documents should be considered inherently more reliable than
the wampum belts, porcelain collars, talking sticks, pictographs or birch
scrolls used by aboriginal people to record events at the time in metaphors
or symbols capable of consistent interpretation. Arguably, the fact that
the courts have imposed the requirement of documentary proof of
aboriginal history in itself imposes a eurocentric test.
Furthermore, it is of great concern that the Supreme Court has decided
that where such historical records are put forward for the first time on
161. C. Bishop & M.E. Smith, "Early Historic Populations in Northwestern Ontario" (1975)
40:1 Am. Antiquity 54.
162. Supra note 8 1.
163. Supra note 6.
164. Personal communications, Darlene Johnston, Chippewas of Nawash. There is a refer-
ence to this document in P. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto: U. of Toronto,
199 1), but the year of the Proclamation is incorrect and its contents are not recited, Dr. Schmalz
having not apparently appreciated its significance at the time.
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appeal, the appellate court possesses the expertise to review such mate-
rials and to draw accurate inferences from their contents by way of
"judicial notice" simply because the documents are public in nature. This
practice is fundamentally flawed.
Certainly, a trial court is entitled to take judicial notice of certain
historical facts contained in authoritative sources such as published
maps161 and articles. Where introduced through an expert, such docu-
ments form the basis for the opinion expressed and may be admitted as
evidence without prior notice. Copies of historical documents are also
admissible at trial if certified by the official in whose custody the
document is placed. Imperial Proclamations, treaties and other docu-
ments may be proven at trial "in the same manner as they may be provable
in any court of England" or where published, by production of the Canada
Gazette or Queen's Printer copies.166
But the Supreme Court is not a trial court. It does not hear viva voce
evidence from experts who frequently offer conflicting opinions derived
from the same historical documents. The discipline of history is an
evolving one, and opinions change as new materials are found and new
disciplines, such as ethno-history and historical geography, develop.
More importantly, if the Supreme Court of Canada gets its facts wrong by
behaving as a court of first instance, there is no remedy to correct the
wrong, no higher court to which to appeal.
Yet the Supreme Court of Canada determined in Siouit 67 that it could
entertain historical information for the first time on appeal and even
conduct its own historical research. It has recently re-affirmed its capac-
ity to entertain historical documentation for the first time on appeal in
Nikal. In Sioui, Justice Lamer had written:
I am of the view that all the documents to which I will refer whether my
attention was drawn to them by the intervenor or as a result of my personal
research are documents of a historical nature which I am entitled to rely on
pursuant to the concept ofjudicial knowledge. As Norris, J.A. said in White
and Bob: "The Court is entitled 'to take judicial notice of the facts of
h isto ry ....1,,68
165. See R. v. Bartleman (1984), 55 B.C.L.R. (4th) 78, 12 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 488
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Zundel (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref d
61 O.R. (2d) 588n, and with regard to maps, R. v. Jameson, [ 1896] 2 Q.B. 425. See also Sioui,
supra note 122 at 1050, with regard to the admissibility of historical documents on the basis
of judicial notice.
166. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 20.
167. Sioui, supra note 122.
168. Ibid. at 1050 [citation omitted].
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In Nikal, the Court permitted the Crown to introduce new materials, over
the objections of the aboriginal defendants, stating that the documents
were public, and that each party had an opportunity to review them and
make submissions. With respect, this was unfair to the aboriginal parties,
who had not been made aware of such evidence until the matter reached
the Supreme Court and therefore had little opportunity to review it
through further research. Moreover, the fact that documents are public
entirely ignores the context which surrounds them and the potential for
gross misunderstandings as a result. As discussed, the "facts" of history,
particularly where these reflect cross-cultural perspectives and an incom-
plete record, and where these are not agreed upon, ought not to be the
subject of judicial notice. That this has occurred is in itself inconsistent
with the Court's recognition that aboriginal cultures are vastly dissimilar
from European cultures, as noted in the following excerpt calling for the
need to incorporate both perspectives:
The challenge of defining aboriginal rights stems from the fact that they
are rights peculiar to the meeting of two vastly dissimilar legal cultures;
consequently there will always be a question about which legal culture is
to provide the vantage point from which rights are to be defined ... a
morally and politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights will
incorporate both legal perspectives.'69
It is suggested that it is also inappropriate for the Court to make findings
of fact based on historical evidence contained in affidavits or referred to
in argument which were not subjected to cross-examination. Such evi-
dence cannot be properly assessed without the benefit of hearing and
evaluating expert opinions concerning its context or content. This is
particularly so when expert historical opinions differ, as they do in these
cases. In Nikal, for example, the Supreme Court decided that the band had
not proven that it could exercise by-law authority within its fisheries
because the Court determined that there was a clear policy against
granting exclusive fishing rights, not just in British Columbia but in
Upper Canada as well. This finding was based on the 1866 opinion of
James Cockburn, Solicitor General of the Province of Canada. The Court
then quoted Cockburn as follows:
With reference to the claim of the Indians to exclusive fishing rights, my
opinion is that they have no other or larger rights over the public waters of
this province than those which belong at common law to Her Majesty's
subjects in general.... I should say that without an Act of Parliament
169. M. Walters, "British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment
on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1992) 17 Queen's L.J. 350 at 412-13, quoted in Van der
Peet, supra note 14 at 547 [emphasis added in S.C.R.].
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ratifying such a reservation no exclusive right could thereby be gained by
the Indians as the Crown could not by treaty or act of its own (previous to
the recent statute) grant an exclusive privilege in favour of individuals over
public rights such as this, in respect of which the Crown only holds as
trustee for the general public. 7 °
However, the Supreme Court either was unaware of, or did not cite the
middle portion of the same memorandum which stated that:
Previous to the recent statute, the Crown could not legally have granted an
exclusive right of fishing on the lakes and Navigable waters but under the
3rd section of that Act the power is conferred on the Commissioner of
Crown Lands of granting licences for fishing in favour of private persons,
wheresoever such Fisheries are situated, the only exception is "where the
exclusive right offishing does not already exist by law in favour of private
persons." This exception was intended as I understand to exclude the
application of the Act from certain Fishing rights which had been granted
under the French law in Lower Canada before the Conquest; it certainly
does not apply to the Indian tribes who have acquired no such rights by law
unless it may be contended that in any of those treaties or instruments for
the cession of Indian Territory there are clauses reserving the Exclusive
right offishing .... . '
As for the Court's conclusion that the Crown had a policy against
recognizing exclusive fishing rights, and that such rights did not exist
prior to the Fisheries Act, there are at least two instances wherein First
Nations within Ontario were recognized as having exclusivity by the
Imperial Government and collected rents for the use of their fishing
grounds by white men. 17 2 In one case, recognition took the form of leases
between the First Nation and Europeans affirmed by the Imperial Gov-
ernment well before the enactment of the fisheries legislation. 173
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Canada ought not to be
rendering decisions on the basis of evidence which has not been presented
within a procedural context that permits the defence to respond to and
amplify the history around the documents. Such research can take years,
and should not be thrust upon the defence at the appeal level and certainly
not where the interpretation of "public" historical documents is very
much in dispute among historians themselves.
170. See P.J. Blair, "Solemn Promises and Solum Rights: The Saugeen Ojibway Fishing
Grounds and R. v. Jones and Nadjiwon" (1997) 28 Ottawa L. Rev. 125.
171. National Archives of Canada, Record Group 10 (RG 10) vol. 323 p. 216137-216138
Reel C-9577, A. Russell, Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands to Indian Branch attaching
copy of opinion of James Cockburn, Solicitor General, 8 March 1866.
172. Supra note 170 at note 160.
173. The case of the Saugeen Ojibway leases is the subject of discussion in ibid., while the
rental of fishing grounds by Mohawks at Deseronto has come to light through recently released
files contained in the RG 10 series of the National Archives, Ottawa.
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XI. Existing vs. Unextinguished Right?
The defence must also prove the right is an existing one. This has always
been a confusing burden because proof of extinguishment of such rights
lies upon the Crown. The court in Sparrow stated that "existing" means
"unextinguished" rather than exercisable at a certain time in history.174
For defence purposes, this probably means proving that the right has not
been surrendered or given up by the aboriginal peoples asserting it rather
than attempting to negate Crown evidence of extinguishment; otherwise,
the defence would be put in the position of having to rebut reply evidence
not yet called by the Crown.
However, the burden of proof imposed as a result of the Supreme
Court's decisions is impossible to decipher. If the defence burden of
proving that the right is existing involves proof on the balance of
probabilities, then the Crown proof that the right is not existing should
also be on the balance of probabilities. However, proof of "extinguish-
ment" of the right lies upon the Crown. If extinguishment is tantamount
to disproving the existence of the right, the test as it currently stands
makes no sense. Indeed, in Sparrow, the Crown had argued that the
appellant's evidence had been insufficient to prove an aboriginal right.'75
The Supreme Court recast the Crown's argument to state that what the
Crown "really insisted on, both in this court and the court below, was that
the Musqueam Band's aboriginal right to fish had been extinguished by
regulations under the Fisheries Act. 176
With respect, the Crown's argument made more sense than the
Supreme Court's interpretation of it. An aboriginal right which has been
extinguished is not an "existing" right, and had the Crown's evidence of
.extinguishment been accepted, the accused might have failed to prove
that his right was an existing one according to the requisite standard of
proof. If the Crown's onus of extinguishment is greater than the accused's
onus of proving an existing right, then the accused does not have to prove
the existence of the right on a balance of probabilities, but according to
some lower standard. The Supreme Court accepted, however, that the
"onus of proving the Sovereign intended to extinguish the Indian title lies
on the respondent and that intention must be 'clear and plain.' "177 In cases
where an aboriginal right has not been proven to exist, evidence of
extinguishment is not necessary. Where the right is proven to be existing,
174. Supra note 4 at 1092.
175. Ibid. at 1095.
176. Ibid.
177. Dissentingjudgment of Hall J. in Calder, supra note 77 at 404, quoted in Sparrow, supra
note 4 at 1099.
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evidence of extinguishment has not been persuasive. Because of the
Supreme Court's comments, it is not possible to determine who has the
onus of proving the existence of the right-the person who asserts its
existence or the Crown who denies it.
After the defence has proven an aboriginal or treaty right, and even
before it is called upon to present proof of prima facie infringement, the
Crown may call evidence of extinguishment.'78
In Sparrow, the Supreme Court followed its ruling in R. v. Simon, 17 9
to the effect that "[g]iven the serious and far-reaching consequences of a
finding that a treaty right has been extinguished, it seems appropriate to
demand the strict proof of the fact of extinguishment in each case where
the issue arises."'80 Proof of the extinguishment of a treaty right requires
even greater proof than the extinguishment of an aboriginal right, since
a treaty cannot be extinguished without the express consent of the
aboriginal parties. The Supreme Court stated in Sioui:
It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement.., an
agreement the nature of which is sacred. The very definition of a treaty thus
makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty cannot be
extinguished without the consent of the Indians concerned. 8'
Where aboriginal rights rather than treaty rights are involved, the onus
lies on the Crown and the intention to extinguish must be "clear and
plain."' 82 Assuming that the test of extinguishment of an aboriginal right
is the same for that of aboriginal title, it has been widely held that
aboriginal title can only be extinguished by surrender to the Crown or by
competent legislative authority, and only then by specific legislation.
Evidence of extinguishment of aboriginal rights after 1982 is very
difficult for the Crown to prove, since any infringement of s. 35 rights
post- 1982 imposes a requirement of consultation on the part of the Crown
and is subject to other tests in Sparrow. However, in proceedings before
the Supreme Court of Canada in N. T. C. Smokehouse 83 in October 1995,
counsel for the British Columbia Attorney General argued that the
detailed regulation of food fishing under the Fisheries Act and regulations
amounted to an extinguishment of aboriginal commercial fishing rights
178. Since this would result in yet another leg of the trial, it is suggested that the defence call
evidence of primafacie infringement together with evidence of the s. 35 right, before the Crown
calls extinguishment evidence.
179. [1985] S.C.R. 387
180. Ibid. at 405-6.
181. Sioui, supra note 165 at 1063.
182. Supra note 4 at 1099.
183. Supra note 17.
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by necessary implication. With respect, this argument ignores the oft-cited
contemporaneous protests by the Department of Indian Affairs to such
legislation as an unwarranted interference with aboriginal and treaty
rights.' 84 It is submitted that where two Crown departments disagree over
the effect of legislation, the Crown cannot demonstrate a clear and plain
intention of the Sovereign to extinguish aboriginal rights.
In Gladstone, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that:
None of these regulations, when viewed individually or as a whole, can be
said to express aclear and plain intention to extinguish the aboriginal rights
of the Heiltsuk band. While to extinguish an aboriginal right, the Crown
does not perhaps have to use language which refers expressly to the
extinguishment of aboriginal rights, it must demonstrate more than that, in
the past, the exercise of an aboriginal right has been subject to a regulatory
scheme. ... [T]he failure to recognize an aboriginal right and the failure
to grant special protection to it, do not constitute the clear and plain
intention necessary to extinguish the right.'85
Nonetheless, Justice La Forest was prepared to find that extinguishment
had occurred by virtue of the Crown having regulated the activity of
fishing. He dissented:
I cannot come to any other conclusion than that Order in Council P.C. 2539
evinces a clear and plain intention on the part of the Crown to extinguish
aboriginal rights relating to commercial fisheries-should they ever have
existed. When the Crown has specifically chosen to address the issue of the
translation of aboriginal practices into statutory rights and has expressly
decided to limit the scope of these rights, as was done in British Columbia
in relation to Indian fishing practices, then it follows, in my view, that
aboriginal rights relating to practices that were specifically excluded were
thereby extinguished.'86
This is perhaps unsurprising in light of Justice La Forest's prior opinion
that, despite the provisions of the Royal Proclamation,'87 "there is
complete authority to deal with the [Indian] lands, for the federal
Parliament and possibly the federal government, without statutory autho-
rization, could even abolish the Indian title. A fortiori, the federal
Parliament may negate or modify Indian hunting or fishing rights."'88
184. See, for example V. Lytwyn, "The Usurpation of Aboriginal Fishing Rights: A Study
of the Saugeen Nation's Fishing Islands Fishery in Lake Huron" in B. Hodgins, S. Heard & J.S.
Milloy, eds., Co-existence?: Studies in Ontario-First Nations Relations (Peterborough: Trent
University, 1993) at 81-103.
185. Supra note 16 at750, 753.
186. Ibid. at 795.
187. Supra note 81.
188. G.V. La Forest, Water Law in Canada - The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa: Dept. of
Regional Economic Expansion, 1973).
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Yet it was Justice La Forest for the majority in Sparrow who, with
Justice Dickson, held that the detailed regulation of a right cannot amount
to extinguishment of it. 89 As stated in Sparrow:
At bottom the [Crown's] argument confuses regulation with extinguish-
ment. That the right is controlled in great detail by the regulations does not
mean that the right is thereby extinguished.9°
Because inland and coastal fisheries remain under federal jurisdiction,
and the Fisheries Act prior to 1982 contained no express extinguishment
of aboriginal sustenance activities, it is difficult to foresee how the Crown
can prove extinguishment of an aboriginal right in the absence of express
consent on the part of the aboriginal parties affected, since the legislation
does not reveal a clear and plain intention of the Sovereign to extinguish
such rights. 9' Indeed, it can be argued that amendments to the Fisheries
Actin 1993192 enabling aboriginal communal fishing licences to be issued
for purposes including commercial fishing negates any argument that
either subsistence or commercial fishing activities have been extin-
guished by necessary implication. The fact that onejudge of the Supreme
Court was prepared to find such extinguishment in Gladstone, without
even referring to legislation protecting such rights, is deeply troubling.
XII. Prima Facie Infringement
Having proven the right, the accused must show that the preferred means
of exercising the right has been infringed. As set out in Sparrow, certain
questions must be asked in determining this question, such as whether the
limitation is unreasonable, whether it imposes undue hardship and
whether it denies to the rights holders their preferred means of exercising
the right. Frequently, this involves conditions of licence.
The most recent decision dealing with the question of prima facie
infringement on the issue of licensing is Nikal. In that case, the Crown
argued that if one is charged with fishing without a licence, it is no defence
to say that if the accused had obtained a licence, the conditions attached
to it would have constituted a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1). In
189. Supra note 4 at 1097.
190. Ibid.
191. In Ontario, management of fisheries has been delegated by the federal government to the
province. However, the Ontario Fishery Regulations are still federal Orders-in-Council under
the federal Fisheries Act: Ontario Fishery Regulations, 1989, SOR/89-93.
192. The Aboriginal Communal Fishing Agreement Regulations, SOR/92-415, of the Fish-
eries Act were replaced with the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licence Regulations, SOR/93-
332, on 16 June 1993. The Regulatory Impact Statement notes that terms and conditions of such
licences could authorize the sale of fish harvested under the licence.
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Nikal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the accused was
unable to prove such an infringement. The licence in Nikal was framed
to suit individual members of the band, was issued free of charge,
permitted the use of traditional equipment, contained no restrictions as to
number of fish that could be caught, and permitted fishermen to select
members of their extended family who could use and consume the fish
caught. The majority view of the British Columbia Court of Appeal was
that
[i]n the context of an aboriginal rights case, I do not think that the licence
and its conditions can be separated. If it can be shown that a licence was
not obtained because the conditions would be unreasonable, would consti-
tute an undue hardship or deprive an Indian of the preferred means of
exercising his or her aboriginal rights, then the requirement that one hold
a licence subject to such conditions would constitute a prima facie
infringement of an aboriginal right. In such a case, the licensing require-
ments would be unconstitutional, and a charge based on that requirement
would fail.1
93
The Supreme Court of Canada followed this line of reasoning, holding
that the conditions of licence are not severable from a licence. The
Supreme Court of Canada (7:2) held that four of the conditions were
primafacie infringements of Mr. Nikal's aboriginal rights, requiring the
Crown to meet the onus of justification. 194 Because the Crown had not
done so, the licence was unconstitutional and no offence could exist
under it.
[The conditions] are an integral and essential part of the licence. They
stipulate the conditions or terms upon which the licence is issued and the
holder may use it. A licence holder is required to abide by the conditions.
The licence is issued on that basis. The conditions are unconstitutional. As
a result of the conditions the licence is invalid. It follows that there cannot
be an offence of fishing without a licence in 1986. The licence as issued
in 1986 pursuant to section 4(1) of the British Columbia Fishery (General)
Regulations is as invalid as any other Act or Regulation which is found to
be unconstitutional or ultra vires .... [A]n invalid act or regulation cannot
create an offence.' 95
The case is puzzling in that Mr. Nikal did not have a licence. The court
apparently imputed to Mr. Nikal conditions of licence which appeared on
a communal fishing licence that had been developed by the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans after consultation with Mr. Nikal's band, but
which the band declined to renew on the advice of their elders, preferring
193. (1993), 80 B.C.L.R. (2d) 245 at 258, MacFarlane, Taggart, and Wallace JJ.A. concurring
on this point.
194. Supra note 8.
195. Ibid. at 1066.
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to direct their own fishermen as to when and where to fish. As such, it is
hard to understand the Court's rationale for determining that the condi-
tions of licence were nonetheless infringements of Mr. Nikal's rights,
particularly when it was not the conditions of licence which were put in
issue by the defence but Mr. Nikal's aboriginal rights to defer to his
elders, an issue not addressed by the Supreme Court at all.
Because conditions of licence which affected Mr. Nikal were prima
facie infringements of his aboriginal rights, and were notjustified by the
Crown, the entire licence was held to be invalid. It is suggested that based
on Nikal, the presence of any condition which cannot be justified by the
Crown and which infringes an aboriginal right will be sufficient to render
the entire licence invalid. It appears that would be so even if the condition
is not fundamental, a point noted by Justice McLachlin, who dissented
from the majority decision, but who noted with distress that the practical
result of the decision was that the unconstitutionality of any one condition
of licence was sufficient to render the entire licence invalid. 19 6
The Supreme Court of Canada in Nikal reiterated the tests set out in
Sparrow and concluded that on facts before it, the simple requirement of
a licence was not unreasonable. The second test of "undue hardship" was
not met by proving mere inconvenience. The third test, whether the rights
holder is denied the preferred means of exercising the right, could not be
affected by a licence alone without its conditions, since the Court ruled
that a licence, at its most basic, was simply a means of identification. 197
However, the Court held that the government is required to justify
conditions of licence which on their face infringe the s. 35 right to fish.
These included the restriction of fishing to fishing for food only, the
restriction to fishing for the fisherman's family only, the restriction to
fishing for salmon only and the requirement that food fishing at certain
dates be licensed by a conservation officer.198 Other terms of licence
which provided for prescribed waters in which fishing could take place,
the type of gear which could be used and the times and days at which
fishing might occur could be infringements depending on whether they
infringed the appellant's aboriginal rights. Since the trial judge had not
found that the appellant's aboriginal fights included the right to determine
when fishing should occur and the method and manner of such fishing,
the Court was unable to say whether the appellant's aboriginal rights had
been infringed. 199
196. Dissenting Reasons of McLachlin J., ibid. at 1071.
197. Ibid. at 1060.
198. Ibid. at 1061-62.
199. Ibid. at 1063.
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Fishing licences are usually subject to restrictions as to catch limits,
closed seasons, sizes of fish that can be taken and types of equipment
that can be used. In R. v. Bombay, the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested
that any interference will amount to prima facie interference. 20 ° The
Supreme Court in Nikal has indicated that more is required than mere
inconvenience .
201
XIII. Crown Justification Evidence
The onus of proof of justification on the Crown has already been
discussed. The various tests of justification where food fishing is at issue
are set out in Sparrow. The Crown bears the burden of justifying any
legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right protected
by s. 35(1). This includes proving a valid legislative objective,20 2 that top
priority has been given to aboriginal food fishing, minimal infringement
in order to effect the desired result, the availability of fair compensation
in a situation of expropriation, and consultation with the aboriginal group
in question with respect to the conservation measures being imple-
mented.2 3 As well, the honour of the Crown must be the first consider-
ation in determining whether justification had been proven. 204
However, as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Nikal, the
concept of reasonableness has been added and now forms the lens through
which the Sparrow test ofjustification is to be viewed. The Crown, then,
may simply need to prove that the infringements created by the licensing
scheme are in the end result, reasonable.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Nikal held that in considering
whether there has been minimal infringement, the infringement must be
looked at in the context of the situation presented. If the context is such
that the infringement could reasonably be considered to be as minimal as
possible, then it will meet the test. 2 5 The Supreme Court has most
recently held that the mere fact that there may be other solutions that
might amount to lesser infringement should not, in itself, lead to an
automatic finding that infringement cannot bejustified.2° The Court has
also noted that the greater the urgency and the graver the situation, the
200. R. v. Bombay (1993), 61 O.A.C. 312, [1993] 1 C.N.L.R. 92.
201. Supra note 8 at 1060.
202. Supra note 4 at 1114.
203. Ibid. at 1119.
204. Ibid. at 1114.
205. Supra note 8 at 1065.
206. Ibid.
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more reasonable strict measures may appear.2 °7 This in itself is inconsis-
tent with Sparrow, which had clearly delineated the test of "as little
infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result.-
20 8
In proving justification, the Crown must prove that it has a valid
legislative objective, such as conservation. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has assumed a valid legislative objective when no evidence has been
advanced to provide a rational connection between the regulatory scheme
and the objective of conservation. For instance, licensing was upheld in
Nikal as being "nothing more than a form of identification. ' '2 9 The issue
should surely not be an inquiry into whether the requirement of a licence
meets the objective of conservation but whether the impugned conditions
are necessary to effect the legislative objective."'
An existing aboriginal right gives the members of the band involved
a priority over other user groups in the allocation of any surplus once the
needs of conservation have been met. While a treaty right may contain a
promise of exclusivity,2"1 the Supreme Court has yet to deal with a treaty
case involving fishing rights. To date, however, the Court has been loathe
to recognize more than the priority set out in Sparrow:
Conservation is a valid legislative concern. The appellants concede as
much. Their concern is in the allocation of the resource after reasonable
and necessary conservation measures have been recognized and given
effect to. They do not claim the right to pursue the last living salmon until
it is caught. Their position, as I understand it, is one which would give
effect to an order of priorities of this nature: (i) conservation; (ii) Indian
fishing; (iii) non-Indian commercial fishing; or (iv) non-Indian sports
fishing; the burden of conservation measures should not fall primarily
upon the Indian fishery.... I agree with the tenor of this argument.
212
Thus, according to Sparrow, the Crown must first establish that the
management scheme in place accords with the Sparrow priority and that
207. Ibid. at 1065.
208. Supra note 4 at 1119.
209. Nikal, supra note 8 at 1060.
210. In R. v. Agawa (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 505,53 D.L.R. (4th) 101, [1988] C.N.L.R. 73, leave
to appeal ref d [1990] 2 S.C.R. v, cited with approval in Nikal, supra note 8, the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that the requirement of a commercial fishing licence was a reasonable restriction
on the band's treaty right to fish as it served a valid conservation purpose. However, in Jones,
supra note 6 the court held that a quota restriction on a commercial licence was not a reasonable
restriction on the band's treaty and aboriginal rights to fish, even where the species at issue was
considered vulnerable, where expert evidence established that the quota could have been
doubled without any effect on conservation, Jones, ibid.
211. In Jones, ibid. the court found there was a promise of exclusivity but upheld only a
priority allocation.
212. R. v.Jack, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294at 313, 100D.L.R. (3d) 193, [1979] 2C.N.L.R. 25, quoted
in Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1115-1116.
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it contains no underlying unconstitutional objective of shifting the
resource to lower ranked users.21 3 To meet this burden of proof, the
Crown would have to establish that the management scheme was not
weighted in favour of non-aboriginal or commercial users of the resource
and that the aboriginal priority within the resource has been recognized.
In Van der Peet, however, the Supreme Court decided that since commer-
cial fishing rights lacked "internal limits" and were determined solely by
market conditions, these must not result in a priority of the type recog-
nized in Sparrow.
Again, Justice McLachlin dissented, focusing her concerns both on the
essentially subjective basis of the test of "distinctive and integral" as
uncertain, and the fundamental unfairness of re-allocating constitutional
rights to non-natives once a s. 35 right had been proven. Justice McLachlin
clearly believed that although purporting to follow and enhance the
Sparrow test, the Chief Justice had, in fact, contradicted it. She stated:
Finally, the proposed test is, in my respectful opinion, too categorical.
Whether something is integral or not is an all or nothing test. Once it is
concluded that a practice is integral to the people's culture, the right to
pursue it obtains unlimited protection, subject only to the Crown's right to
impose limits on the ground of justification. In this appeal, the Chief
Justice's exclusion of "commercial fishing" from the right asserted masks
the lack of internal limits in the integral test. But the logic of the test
remains ineluctable, for all that: assuming that another people in another
case establishes that commercial fishing was integral to its ancestral
culture, that people will, on the integral test, logically have an absolute
priority over non-aboriginal and other less fortunate aboriginal fishers,
subject only to justification. All others, including other native fishers
unable to establish commercial fishing as integral to their particular
cultures, may have no right to fish at all.
The Chief Justice recognizes the all or nothing logic of the "integral"
test in relation to commercial fishing rights in his reasons in Gladstone.
Having determined in that case that an aboriginal right to commercial
fishing is established, he notes that unlike the Indian food fishery, which
is defined in terms of the peoples' need for food, the right to fish
commercially "has no internal limitations". Reasoning that where the test
for the right imposes no internal limit on the right, the court may do so, he
adopts a broad justification test which would go beyond limiting the use
of the right in ways essential to its exercise as envisioned in Sparrow, to
permit partial reallocation of the aboriginal right to non-natives. The
historically based test for aboriginal rights which I propose, by contrast,
possesses its own internal limits and adheres more closely to the principles
that animated Sparrow, as I perceive them.21 1
213. Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1121.
214. Supra note 14 at 639-40 [citations omitted].
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Where commercial activities are at issue, a broader justification test was
outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada, based on the notion that food
fishing contains "internal limits" which do not apply to commercial
fishing. Commercial fishing, the Court held, would otherwise be limited
only by market and availability of the resource. This decision again
reflects eurocentric views of the use of "resources." Aboriginal people
have a very different view of their relationship with fish and game than
has been suggested by the Court. As stated by anthropologist Ronald
Trosper:
The difference between [North] American Indians and the dominant
culture regarding the man/nature orientation is probably the best known.
Most tribes share the idea that man should live in harmony with his
surroundings. Indian spirituality demands respect for the natural world.
Failure to preserve balance in one's interaction with nature can be
dangerous. Christian spirituality, following its early roots in Greece and
Judea, allows man to dominate in the natural world."'
It is suggested that Western society sees resources such as fish as
commodities with an economic value based on the ability to utilize them.
Western society measures such resources through their sustainability and
productivity based on their capture; even fish populations are measured
by escapement, that is, how many fish manage to get away. Trosper notes
that "[c]ompartmentalizing knowledge and dominating nature, the domi-
nant society can see in a forest only the few useful products-wood fibre,
game animals, water-that can be marketed.121 6 However, the aboriginal
world view of its relationship with such "resources" is markedly differ-
ent. One aboriginal person explained:
In terms of Anishnabe people, these animals were better understood as our
relatives. Many of them are clan totems of our people. We have our own
ways of speaking about them and relating to them. Our knowledge of our
animals is often expressed in the language of our ceremonies. But it reflects
a great complexity and sophistication which the MNR bureaucrats and
scientists do not know about. Our knowledge has arisen out of relation-
ships to our lands and animals.
All of the white man's science used to make management decisions for
quotas was based on their relationships with the land. It was against our
relationships to our land and each other as Anishnabe people on our lands.
This science is not objective. It is a tool of the white man that reflects his
understanding of the land. It reflects his social relationships to the land.217
215. R. Trosper, "Mind Sets and Economic Developments" in S. Cornell & J. Kalt, eds., What
Can Tribes Do? (Los Angeles: University of Califomia, 1992) at 310.
216. Ibid. at 318.
217. R. Ross, Returning to the Teachings (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1996) at 262.
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Ross Waukey, an Ojibway elder from an Ontario fishing community in
which commercial fishing rights have been recognized as both an
aboriginal and a treaty right218 put it this way:
In Indian thinking, any living thing on earth is just like people. We live
together and work together. Fish are living too. Everything works together.
We cannot destroy things. Anything nature provides cannot be destroyed
because you're destroying yourself at the same time.219
The Supreme Court made a number of assumptions about how aboriginal
communities would conduct themselves in the pursuit of an aboriginal
fishery. These assumptions did not take into account aboriginal cultural
values, but applied eurocentric values without questioning their applica-
tions to a very different culture.
The suggestion that aboriginal societies are incapable of setting
internal limits for their fishers except where these are defined by "need"
demonstrates a lack of appreciation for the capacity of aboriginal societ-
ies to self-regulate. Nor does the decision reflect any recognition that
aboriginal peoples have been engaged in commercial fishing activities
for hundreds of years. Many archaeological sites on the Great Lakes,
dating back to 1000 A.D. contain huge deposits of whitefish and lake trout
bones, attesting to the effectiveness of the gill net fishery which evolved
as commercial fishing activities developed. As anthropologist Charles
Cleland describes:
So thoroughly were the native peoples of the Upper Lakes adapted to the
gill net fishery that their population density, social system and seasonal
movement was geared to this resource. 20
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Anishnabeg
(Algonquin-speaking people including the Chippewa, or Ojibway) traded
and bartered fish to the French and British and were thoroughly integrated
into the market economy. The Supreme Court did not seem to understand
that commercial fishing activities have been part of aboriginal economies
for hundreds of years. Instead, the Court assumed that if these rights were
recognized as entitled to constitutional protection, aboriginal peoples
would abuse them. There was no evidence before the Court upon which
such a conclusion could be based.
218. Ross Waukey is a member of the Chippewas of Nawash Band of Indians, whose
aboriginal and treaty rights to commercially fish were affirmed in Jones, supra note 6.
219. Ross Waukey, as related by D. Johnston, "Aboriginal Fishing: Traditional Knowledge
and Evolving Resource Stewardship" (Paper given at Canadian Bar Association - Ontario/
Canadian Aquatic Resources Society Conference, Aboriginal Fishing, Traditional Values and
Sustainable Resource Development, Wahta Mohawk First Nation, 29-30 September 1996)
[unpublished] note 186.
220. Ibid.
Prosecuting the Fishery: The Supreme Court of Canada
The Court also determined that aboriginal people engaged in commer-
cial activities deserved no greater right to share in the fishery than
non-aboriginal users. In Gladstone,22 ' the Court was dealing with an
aboriginal right which according to Sparrow, results in recognition of a
priority interest rather than an exclusive one. In Gladstone, the Supreme
Court indicated the test for "commercial fishing" is vague but involves an
examination of government actions to see whether the government has
taken into account the existence and importance of such rights.222 The
Court held, however, that this priority is to be determined, in part, on the
percentage of aboriginal people within the general population, stating:
Questions relevant to the determination of whether the government has
granted priority to aboriginal rights holders are those enumerated in
Sparrow relating to consultation and compensation, as well as questions
such as whether the government has accommodated the exercise of the
aboriginal right to participate in the fishery (through reduced licence fees,
forexample), whether the government's objectives in enacting a particular
regulatory scheme reflect the need to take into account the priority of
aboriginal rights holders, the extent of the participation in the fishery of
aboriginal rights holders relative to their percentage of the population,
how the government has accommodated different aboriginal rights in a
particular fishery (food versus commercial rights, for example) how
important the fishery is to the economic and material well-being of the
band in question, and the criteria taken into account by the government in,
for example, allocating commercial licences amongst different users....
These questions, like those in Sparrow, do not represent an exhaustive list
of the factors that may be taken into account in determining whether the
government can be said to have give priority to aboriginal rights holders;
they give some indication, however, of what such an inquiry should look
like. 23
It is submitted that the questions relating to relative participation by
aboriginal peoples in a fishery, or their economic and material well-being
relative to non-aboriginal users, should be irrelevant. At best, they
establish equivalency rather than an aboriginal priority. Before reaching
the test of justification, a court is required to determine the existence of
an aboriginal right both distinctive and integral to the aboriginal culture
in question. As such, any examination based on proportionate participa-
tion in the fishery as a test of justification ignores the disproportionate
value of the activity to the particular aboriginal society relative to the
general population. After all, it was precisely this overwhelming cultural
221. Supra note 16.
222. Ibid. at 767.
223. Ibid. at 768.
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importance which the aboriginal accused was required to prove in order
to establish the right in the first place.
Indeed, the Court inAdams"' recognized that fishing activities are not
of overwhelming importance to the general public where food fishing is
involved, although the Court suggested that the outcome could be
different if evidence of a meaningful economic dimension (to
non-aboriginal users) was involved.
I have some difficulty in accepting in the circumstances of this case that
the enhancement of sports fishing per se is a compelling and substantial
objective for the purposes of s. 35(1). While sports fishing is an important
economic activity in some parts of the country, in this instance, there is no
evidence that the sports fishing that this scheme sought to promote had a
meaningful economic dimension to it. On its own, without this sort of
evidence, the enhancement of sports fishing accords with neither of the
purposes underlying the protection of aboriginal rights and cannot justify
the infringement of those rights. It is not aimed at the recognition of distinct
aboriginal cultures. Nor is it aimed at the reconciliation of aboriginal
societies with the rest of Canadian society, since sports fishing without
evidence of a meaningful economic dimension, is not "of such over-
whelming importance to Canadian society as a whole" to warrant the
limitation of aboriginal rights.225
The Court does not explain how the participation by other users in an
aboriginal fishery resulting in an economic benefit to those users should
result in the denial of an aboriginal priority which might transfer that
economic benefit to the people most entitled to it. Indeed, applying a test
of economic proportionality might well result in a less thanjust allocation
of the resource to an aboriginal population which has been denied historic
access to that resource on the basis that its current level of participation
suggests the fishery is not important to its economic or material wellbeing.
Similarly, using the proportional participation level of aboriginal
peoples in a fishery as a determinant of justification assumes that all
members of a band or tribal council could have had access to the fishery
if they so desired. The reality is that many aboriginal communities with
strong cultural links to the fisheries have been systematically excluded as
a result of quota restrictions and licence restrictions which have favoured
non-aboriginal parties.22 6 The test proposed by the Court would perpetu-
ate rather than remedy such injustices. As suggested by Justice McLachlin
224. Supra note 46.
225. Supra note 96 at 34.
226. In Jones, supra note 6, there were only two or three aboriginal fishermen in the water
as a result of quota restrictions limiting the total catch for the community to 10,000 lbs., with
a total value of approximately $20,000.
Prosecuting the Fishery: The Supreme Court of Canada
in her dissenting judgment in Van der Peet, there is no legal basis for this
approach, which would serve to negate the aboriginal right itself:
[Considering] matters like economic and regional fairness and the inter-
ests of non-aboriginal fishers ... would negate the very aboriginal fight to
fish itself, on the ground that this is required for the reconciliation of
aboriginal rights and other interests and the consequent good of the
community as a whole. This is not limitation required for the responsible
exercise of the right, but rather limitation on the basis of the economic
demands of non-aboriginals. It is limitation of a different order than
the conservation, harm prevention type of limitation sanctioned in
Sparrow....
Such an approach, I fear, has the potential to violate not only the
Crown's fiduciary duty toward native peoples, but to render meaningless




The defence of aboriginal fishing charges frequently involves a reliance
on s. 35 rights. A review of recent Supreme Court of Canada cases,
however, reveals the imposition of unattainable burdens of proof on the
defence and a relaxation of the burden of proof on the Crown in what are
supposed to be criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. The Supreme
Court has introduced new elements of proof which are inconsistent with
thejustificatory analysis contained in Sparrow and which serve to favour
the Crown. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Canada has imposed new
procedural and substantive requirements on aboriginal accuseds which
themselves are potentially unconstitutional. The result of these new tests
is to advance political, rather than legal, objectives at the expense of
constitutionalized aboriginal and treaty rights.
227. Supra note 14 at 661-62.
